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Should appellate courts raise and decide issues that the parties have 
not presented and argued?  The Supreme Court often insists it will not 
decide issues that have not been raised below.1  But the Supreme 
Court—and lower appellate courts—frequently fall off the wagon. 
In fact, some of the Supreme Court’s most famous opinions decided 
issues not presented by the briefs or addressed below.  In Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins, the Court overturned sua sponte an ancient precedent on 
applying the common law in diversity cases.2  Mapp v. Ohio overrules a 
prior case and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the 
states, without briefing or argument on the issue.3  In Washington v. 
Davis, the Court decided that Title VII standards did not apply to 
constitutional discrimination, even though the parties had agreed that 
they did.4  Younger v. Harris prohibits injunctions against pending state 
 
 1. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 205 (2001). 
 2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 81–90 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting). 
 3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961).  Mapp overruled Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for 
unreasonable searches and seizures to the states.  According to the Court, that issue was 
not raised by the appellant but was raised by amicus curiae, who was permitted to 
participate in oral argument.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3.  But see id. at 671 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the question was raised, albeit not argued).  In dissent, Justice 
Harlan emphasized that the issue had not been briefed or argued, the appellant’s counsel 
had disclaimed overruling Wolf, and the amicus brief mentioned by the Court had only 
raised the point in a paragraph.  Id. at 672–74 & nn.4–6, 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the case should have been set for reargument after additional briefing). 
 4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). 
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court criminal cases, even though the issue was not argued on appeal.5  
Indeed, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Court held that due process requires 
hearings and an opportunity to make submissions before a state can 
terminate the parental rights of unwed fathers.6  But the Court decided 
this without briefing or argument—without a hearing on the issue or an 
opportunity for the parties to make submissions.7 
What should happen when an appellate court looks at the briefs and 
arguments presented by the parties and feels that the issue has not been 
framed correctly?  When appellate judges believe that a potentially 
dispositive issue was missed by the parties, they have several options:  
(1) they can ignore the issue;8 (2) they can spot the issue in their opinion, 
but treat it as not properly raised or waived; (3) they can spot the issue 
and remand it for resolution in the first instance in the trial court; (4) 
they can ask the parties for supplemental briefs before deciding the 
issue; (5) they can decide the issue without briefs; (6) they can spot the 
issue in the opinion, and write dicta. 
Courts make one of these six choices every day.  But the Supreme 
Court and other appellate courts have failed to follow any consistent 
practice about sua sponte holdings.9  The difficulty courts have is 
illustrated by the fact that even the most prominent appellate judges 
sometimes say they want procedural regularity, but in other cases 
exercise the freedom to do what they like.  Some examples follow. 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote: “As I have said before, ‘the 
adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the 
initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the 
questions for review.’”10  But, he also wrote: “Notwithstanding the 
 
 5. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971). 
 6. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 7. Id. at 659–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for raising the 
due process issue sua sponte without briefing and argument). 
 8. Common sense tells us that appellate judges choose to ignore many issues that 
have not been briefed.  Most of the time, we cannot show it; the court will not record that 
it has ignored issues.  Cf. Letter from Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to the Chicago Council of Lawyers (Dec. 28, 1993) 
(stating that the author would discuss issues not recognized by the parties and “say  
outright what other judges prefer to keep under their hat”), quoted in Chicago Council of 
Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 794–95 (1994).  One set of decisions where we do know that the 
Court ignored issues were those leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954).  The implications of the decisions striking down aspects of de jure 
segregation were clear for decades, but the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) avoided a frontal attack for many years.  The Supreme Court, 
in turn, avoided addressing the larger issues until 1954.  See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975). 
 9. See infra notes 128–66 and accompanying text. 
 10. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
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apparent waiver of the issue below, I believe that the Court should reach 
the issue . . . because resolution of the question is so clearly antecedent 
to disposition of this case.”11  In addition he wrote: 
In these circumstances, although I suppose it is possible that reargument might 
enable some of us to have a better informed view of a problem that has been 
percolating in the courts for several years, I believe the Court acts wisely in 
resolving the issue now on the basis of the arguments that have already been 
fully presented without any special invitation from this Court.12 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: “The premise of our adversarial system 
is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry 
and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and 
argued by the parties before them.”13  Elsewhere, he said: “The rule that 
points not argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential 
rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, 
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial 
one.”14  But he also said: “[T]he refusal to consider arguments not raised 
is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or constitutional 
mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the contrary.”15  In 
addition, Justice Scalia ruled that even if an issue is not pressed before it, 
 
164, 194–95 n.4 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the desirability of ordering 
supplemental briefing sua sponte concerning questionable precedent (quoting Patterson 
v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 623 (1988) (per curium) (Stevens, J., dissenting 
from order directing reargument) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1216 
(1984) (dissenting from order directing reargument)))); see also Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 255–56 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing that the court sua 
sponte applied different standards to constitutional discrimination than those applied by 
Title VII). 
 11. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1991) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court’s refusal sua sponte to decide an issue that had 
not been briefed or argued by the parties, although it had been raised by amici).  Justice 
Stevens continued: “On a number of occasions, this Court has considered issues waived 
by the parties below and in the petition for certiorari because the issues were so integral 
to decision of the case that they could be considered ‘fairly subsumed’ by the actual 
questions presented.”  Id. at 37. 
 12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 110–11 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(footnote omitted) (overruling a prior constitutional precedent despite the fact that the 
ground used by the Court had been specifically disclaimed by the petitioner; the ground 
had been mentioned by the respondent and discussed by amici). 
 13. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 14. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Justice Scalia added that the rule is inapplicable if the parties agree to a basic, but wrong, 
rule of law.  Id.; see infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 15. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the Supreme Court feels free to raise the issue if it was passed on below.16 
Judge Richard Posner (then Chief Judge), criticized the opinion in 
Hope Clinic v. Ryan,17 where the en banc majority invented a new federal 
remedy sua sponte, and wrote: 
The court . . . expand[s] federal judicial power over the states by a method that 
the Supreme Court has never countenanced and that violates Article III of the 
Constitution.  It is a bone, incidentally, that the plaintiffs didn’t ask for; neither 
side, in either case, requested this novel form of relief or commented on it in 
their briefs.  We are taking a leap into the unknown without any input from the 
parties.18 
On allowing a party to raise an issue for the first time at oral argument, 
Judge Posner said: “[I]t would not be quite cricket of us to place 
decision” on a ground not raised until the oral argument on appeal, 
because the other party may have been lulled into presenting its case 
differently.19  Similarly, Judge Posner has emphasized the importance of 
waiver to the adversary system, writing: 
Ours is an adversarial system; the judge looks to the parties to frame the issues 
for trial and judgment.  Our busy district judges do not have the time to play the 
“proactive” role of a Continental European judge.  True, they want to do justice 
as well as merely umpire disputes, and they should not be criticized when they 
point out to counsel a line of argument or inquiry that he has overlooked, 
although they are not obliged to do so and (with immaterial exceptions) they 
may not do so when an issue has been waived.20 
 
 16. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995). 
 17. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), motion for stay of mandate denied by 
equally divided court, 197 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacated by 530 U.S. 1271 
(2000).  In Hope Clinic, Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion sua sponte invented a 
“precautionary injunction” against a state statute.  That remedy preserved the statute’s 
constitutionality by declaring some potential applications unconstitutional.  Id. at 867–
70, 875. 
 18. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 876 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).  For that matter, 
compare Judge Easterbrook’s decision in Hope Clinic with his comments in Afterword: 
On Being a Commercial Court: 
  I have also left out of the list [of praiseworthy qualities in judges] any 
praise for judges who seize the moment to write essays about issues the parties 
did not present.  Just as parties may choose the terms of their contract, they 
may choose the subjects of their litigation.  Resolving a case on a ground not 
presented denies the parties this autonomy and increases the risk that an 
uninformed opinion will impede rather than promote commerce.  It is hard 
enough to navigate when the court sticks to questions fully ventilated by 
counsel. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Afterword: On Being a Commercial Court, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
877, 880 (1989). 
 19. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp. Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th 
Cir. 1996).  See also Hartmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 
1993) (discussing why the court would not act sua sponte to undo a result the court 
viewed as unjust); see infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
 20. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see 
also Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1259–60 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“I 
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But Judge Posner also said: “Despite much pretense to the contrary by 
judges and lawyers, it is one of the marks of the great judge to recast the 
issues in cases in his own image rather than to assume a passive, 
‘umpireal’ stance.”21 
There are similar examples from many other judges, including Justices 
White, Stewart, and O’Connor.22 
 
wonder in what sense we can claim to have an adversarial system of justice if appellate 
judges conceive their duty to be to search the record . . . for errors that the appellant’s 
counsel missed, and to reverse if any are found. . . .  But the adversarial system is the 
system we have, and ad hoc modifications which cast an appellate judge . . . in the role 
of juge d’instruction are unlikely to improve the system . . . .”). 
 21. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 144 (1990); see also 
Lucien v. Johnson, 61 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that it is permissible to 
reach an unbriefed issue because the court was sure the plaintiff had no claim); Chicago 
Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 795–96 (criticizing the opinion in Marrese v. Am. 
Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated and replaced en 
banc, 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), aff’d en banc, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 
470 U.S. 373 (1985) (deciding the antitrust issue on the merits in an appeal of a 
discovery order)). 
 22. Justice White: compare Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971) (“In this 
posture of the case, the question, although briefed and argued here, is not properly before 
us.”), and City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 130 (1981) (White, J., concurring 
in judgment) (“I much prefer as a matter of policy and common sense to answer the 
question for which we took the case.”), with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 n.10 
(1972) (stating that it was proper for the Court to apply a theory not raised or briefed by 
the parties because the “method of analysis [was] readily available to the state court”). 
Justice Stewart: compare United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696–97 (1975) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for deciding sua sponte an issue raised by a 
pending petition for certiorari in another matter, but not briefed or argued in the current 
case), and Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 631 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for deciding an issue not contained in the petition for certiorari or 
the briefs, and raised only tangentially in oral argument), with Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 
407, 430 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion by Justice 
Stewart for providing a remedy that had not been requested by any party). 
Justice O’Connor: compare Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 67–68 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing with the Court’s decision of 
the ripeness issue that was not considered below and was briefed only in passing), with 
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 540 (1999) (O’Connor, J.) (approving 
consideration of issues waived by the parties below and in certiorari petition because 
they were essential to consideration of the case), and id. at 552–53 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (complaining that the issue discussed by Court was not briefed by the parties 
because they agreed the issue was not before the Court). 
For other examples, see Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 
3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1045 n.88 (1998) (citing inconsistent 
positions taken by Judge Lawrence Silberman) and Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 880. 
Even the Supreme Court Rules reflect this tension.  Rule 24(1)(a) provides that the 
merits brief may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions 
presented in the writ of certiorari or jurisdictional statement.  SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(a).  At 
the same time, Rule 24(1)(a) provides: “At its option, however, the Court may consider a 
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Although the concern has been largely unstated, sua sponte decisions 
trouble judges because due process interests are implicated when a court 
recasts the questions presented and decides a case on issues not 
discussed by the parties without remanding or providing an opportunity 
for briefing.  The fundamental core of due process is that a party should 
have notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a claim is 
decided.23  The adversary system is based on the premise that allowing 
the parties to address the court on the decisive issue increases the 
accuracy of the decision.  In addition, it increases the parties’ sense that 
the court’s process and result are fair.24 
In 1997, the Supreme Court indicated a preference, but not a 
requirement, for requesting supplemental briefing when a court raises a 
new issue sua sponte.25  But the Supreme Court has never squarely 
decided whether due process prevents an appellate court from raising 
new issues without giving the parties a chance to be heard.  As far back 
as 1940, the Court accepted certiorari on the question of whether an 
appellate court could decide a case “on a point not presented or argued 
by the litigants, which the petitioner had never had an opportunity to 
meet by the production of evidence.”26  That case was decided, however, 
on other grounds. 
The absence of a consistent principle leaves courts open to the 
accusation that ignoring the adversary process is a political action, where 
a court reaches out to legislate instead of following judicial norms.27  But 
 
plain error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise 
within its jurisdiction to decide.”  Id.; see also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 
205 (2001) (stating that Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) limits certiorari to the issue 
presented).  See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Deciding What to Decide: The Judges’ 
Bill at 75, 84 JUDICATURE 120, 124–27 (2000) (discussing how the Court’s 
implementation of certiorari to limit review to particular issues is contrary to the original 
understanding that certiorari review would bring up the entire case). 
 23. See, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 465–68 (2000) (stating 
that the trial court could not enter a judgment against a new party on an amended claim 
without giving the party time to respond and an opportunity to be heard); Lachance v. 
Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998); see also, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 
(2000) (suggesting that due process required the Florida Supreme Court to provide the 
“opportunity for argument” before it created a statewide standard for manual recounts in 
the presidential election). 
 24. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); see also infra notes 
54–58 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 92 (1997) (declining to decide whether the 
Fifth Circuit was permitted to raise an issue in a habeas case sua sponte, but expressing 
preference in dicta for supplemental briefing). 
 26. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 416 (1940). 
 27. See Rosemary Krimbel, Note, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A 
Procedure for Judicial Policymaking, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 919, 919–20 & n.6, 942–43 
(1989) (criticizing the sua sponte Supreme Court rehearings as raising countermajoritarian 
difficulty and possibly violating case and controversy requirement (citing KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3–7, 29–33 (1960))). 
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raising and deciding new issues is by no means limited to any one part of 
the political spectrum.  Liberal and conservative judges alike decide new 
issues sua sponte; each side complains when the other does it.28 
There are four serious questions at stake: First, why do appellate 
courts have so much trouble taking consistent positions on waiver and 
raising issues sua sponte?  Second, when are parties entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard before an appellate court decides an 
issue?  Third, what should appellate courts do if they believe that the 
right issue governing the case has not been raised, and they want to raise 
it sua sponte?  Fourth, under what substantive circumstances should 
courts raise issues sua sponte, and when should they treat the issue as 
waived? 
Although these questions raise fundamental concerns about the role of 
appellate courts, the adversary system, and due process, they have 
received surprisingly little attention.29  This Article explores the 
 
 28. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Harlan, Stewart, Marshall, and O’Connor have 
all criticized sua sponte decisionmaking.  See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 
43, 67–68 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing with the Court’s 
decision of the ripeness issue that was not considered below and was briefed only in 
passing); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 522–23 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for deciding an issue that was not litigated or briefed below, and not 
argued in response to the question presented by the Court); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 
671, 696–97 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (deciding a criminal case); Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606, 631 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (pertaining to a grand jury 
proceeding); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659–61 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for raising a due process issue sua sponte without briefing and 
argument); Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. El Paso Nat’l Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464, 473–76 
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for enforcing the Court’s prior mandate 
sua sponte and without full briefing and argument when the parties had settled, and 
claiming that the Court’s desire to “do justice” was improper); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 
234, 246–48 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that the Court decided 
the case on an issue that was missed below and not contained in the petition for certiorari). 
 29. Professor Robert Martineau wrote an entertaining article on a closely related 
subject: what an appellate court should do when a party tries to raise a new issue.  Robert J. 
Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 
VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1987).  Professor Martineau’s article has been cited both for its merits 
and for its citation to the work of Gary Larson.  Id. at 1057 n.137.  See also  Richard V. 
Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised 
and Preserved (pts I–III), 7 WIS. L. REV. 91, 160 (1932), 8 WIS. L. REV. 147 (1933); Allan 
D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 
(1958–59); Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise 
New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985 (1989); Miller, supra note 22, at 1049–51; David 
William Navarro, Comment, Jury Interrogatories and the Preservation of Error in Federal 
Civil Cases: Should the Plain-Error Doctrine Apply?, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1163 (1999); 
Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, What Issues Will the Supreme Court Consider, Though 
Not, or Not Properly, Raised by the Parties, 42 L. Ed. 2d 946 (1976). 
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questions raised by sua sponte dispositions in civil cases.30  Part II 
explores how the age-old tension between law and equity is the source of 
much confusion by the courts.  Part III discusses the “adversary process 
model” of litigation, and shows its relationship to the waiver doctrine.  
Part IV discusses how the courts’ desire to do equity leads both to sua 
sponte decisions and to unpredictability in the courts’ decisionmaking.  
Part V explores whether sua sponte appellate decisions of unbriefed 
issues violate due process.  Part VI proposes that appellate courts should 
give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard when they raise an 
issue sua sponte.  Part VII concludes with suggestions on the most 
difficult problem—when a court should raise new issues sua sponte. 
II.  WHY COURTS ARE INCONSISTENT: THE UNRESOLVED TENSION 
BETWEEN LAW AND EQUITY 
Courts are confused about the power to raise and decide issues sua 
sponte because our appellate system embraces two conflicting historical 
ideas about adjudication.  The first is the idea of the adversary process; 
the second is the courts’ desire to see that justice is done.31  The first 
model assumes a court is an umpire who calls balls and strikes; the 
second expects judges to step in to prevent injustices occurring before 
their eyes.32 
 
 30. Because the policy considerations and rules governing criminal cases are 
different, this Article will focus on civil cases (though some of the governing Supreme 
Court rules derive from criminal and habeas cases).  The role of a court to intervene to 
assure that justice is done is arguably stronger in a criminal case.  This may underlie the 
recognition of the broader scope of the plain error doctrine in criminal cases.  See, e.g., 
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 436–43 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the scope of the court’s powers to act sua sponte in criminal cases); Derrick 
Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of Error Requirement 
in Criminal Cases, 46 KAN. L. REV. 947 (1998); Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty 
States: Some Appellants’ Equal Protection Is More Equal than Others’, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 625, 639–41 (1996) (discussing the scope of the court’s obligation to find issues 
sua sponte when counsel wishes to withdraw in a criminal appeal).  Plain error is not 
always recognized as a ground for review in civil cases.  See infra notes 50–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 31. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1026–28; Krimbel, supra note 27, at 941 (stating 
that “control of the issues by the litigants is central to our adversarial system of law”). 
 32. This tension is illustrated by an oft-told anecdote from Judge Learned Hand: 
[Holmes] was to me the master craftsman certainly of our time; and he said: “I 
hate justice,” which he didn’t quite mean.  What he did mean was this.  I 
remember once I was with him; it was a Saturday when the Court was to 
confer.  It was before we had a motor car, and we jogged along in an old 
coupé.  When we got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so 
as he walked off, I said to him: “Well, sir, goodbye.  Do justice!”  He turned 
quite sharply and he said: “Come here.  Come here.”  I answered: “Oh, I know, 
I know.”  He replied: “That is not my job.  My job is to play the game 
according to the rules.” 
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The conflict is a byproduct of the merger of law and equity.  In the old 
English law courts, lower courts addressed cases brought under specific 
pleading rules, or forms of action.  Appellate courts did not review trial 
court decisions de novo, but instead entertained a “writ of error.”  The 
writ evolved from an independent action against the trial judge or jury 
for a false judgment or verdict.33  A writ of error was required to 
“assign” specific issues in which the trial court made an error under 
existing precedent or analogies to that precedent.34  The appellate court’s 
job was to determine if an error occurred, not to substitute its judgment 
as to who should prevail on the merits.  Appellate courts were not free to 
raise new issues sua sponte; issues not assigned as error were waived.35 
At the same time, English equity courts decided cases not fitting 
within the existing rules of law.36  Equity courts dispensed justice that fit 
the facts of the case, within general rules.  Appellate courts in equity 
were free to consider any issue de novo, whether an issue of law or 
fact.37  Unlike the law courts, equity developed flexible procedures to 
address the needs of individual cases.  One of those procedures was the 
device of rehearing, which allowed the court to address new facts or law 
not originally raised by the parties.  A showing of legal error was not 
 
Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111, 146 
(1996) (alteration in original) (quoting LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE 
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 302, 306–07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)). Professor Herz’s 
essay explores the political uses to which this anecdote has been put as well as the 
tension between concepts of law and justice. 
 33. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1026; Dennerline, supra note 29, at 985–86. 
 34. The Supreme Court’s original appellate jurisdiction was by writ of error.  See  
Krimbel, supra note 27, at 924 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §25, 1 Stat. 73, 
85–86 (1789)).  Certiorari review was not introduced until 1891.  Id. at 925 (citing 
Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). 
 35. Because the appellate court was limited to assigned issues, it could rule only 
on questions reflected in the record, for that was the only basis to determine the lower 
court’s rulings.  At the time, the record consisted of documents filed in court.  Since verbatim 
transcripts were not kept, a party could ask the judge or a third party to record in writing 
the action or inaction of the judge and the party’s exception to the ruling.  This bill of 
exceptions became the basis for the appeal.  See generally Martineau, supra note 29, at 
1026–27; Dennerline, supra note 29, at 986; Krimbel, supra note 27, at 924, 927–30. 
 36. Krimbel, supra note 27, at 928 (“[E]quity exists for circumstances ‘wherein 
the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (1765))). 
 37. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1027 (stating that the “appellate court could 
review the entire case, both law and facts, and render any type of judgment it thought 
justice demanded, without regard to whether the issue upon which the appellate court 
based its judgment had been presented to the lower court”); Dennerline, supra note 29, at 
986. 
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required for a rehearing in equity.38 
Federal courts (and most state courts) long ago merged law and 
equity.  One set of appellate courts administers both systems.39  
Nevertheless, American appellate procedures are overtly based on the 
principles of writ of error review at common law, rather than the appeal 
in equity.40  Some commentators, prominently including Dean Roscoe 
Pound, have criticized this choice, saying that focusing on error limits 
the courts’ proper concern for justice.41  In spite of criticism, the writ of 
error approach, with its emphasis on the adversary process, remains the 
dominant theory of appellate review.42  Under the surface, the historic 
tensions underlying law and equity persist, and still compete in the 
workings of appellate courts.43 
III.  PROCEDURAL REGULARITY: THE ADVERSARY PROCESS MODEL 
The adversary process model of appeal brings with it a set of 
procedural principles that derive from the writ of error and underlie the 
conventional role of appellate courts. 
A.  The “General Rule”: Appellate Courts Only Consider Issues           
Raised by the Parties 
1.  Appellate Courts Will Not Consider Issues Not Raised in                    
the Trial Court 
What Professor Robert Martineau refers to as the “general rule”44 was 
stated by the Supreme Court in Singleton v. Wulff:45 “It is the general 
rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue 
 
 38. See Krimbel, supra note 27, at 927–30. 
 39. See id. at 927. 
 40. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1027–28; see also Edson R. Sunderland, 
Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REV. 3, 7–8 (1940) (“To this day . . . 
we employ formal assignments of error because six hundred years ago the judge was 
held to be entitled to know what were the charges against him . . . .”). 
 41. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1027–28 (citing ROSCOE POUND, 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 107–10, 318–20 (1941)); Sunderland, supra 
note 40, at 7–8.  The idea that law should be about justice and not rules was a theme of 
the legal realists.  See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1028 (citing ROSCOE POUND, 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 107–10, 318–20, 374–76 (1941)).  See 
generally Sunderland, supra note 40. 
 42. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1028. 
 43. See, e.g., Krimbel, supra note 27, at 930 (commenting that the equitable 
decision to rehear a case does not follow from common law and may proceed from 
concepts as varied as “fairness,” “moral good,” and “justice”). 
 44. Martineau, supra note 29. 
 45. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
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not passed upon below.”46  Several provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure require that issues be raised in the trial court, or they 
will be treated as waived.47  Even if a party briefs and argues a question 
in the appellate court, it will be considered waived if not argued below.48  
Further, an issue must have been presented in a timely fashion below; if 
presented too late to the trial court, it is waived.49 
Another formulation of the waiver doctrine is that there is no plain 
error review available in civil cases.50  This differs from criminal 
 
 46. Id. at 120; accord Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001); see 
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1023, 1044. 
It is a long-standing rule that, in order to be reviewable on appeal, a claim or 
issue must have been “pressed or passed upon below.”  The reason for such a 
rule is obvious: “[analyzing] the facts of a particular [issue] without the benefit 
of a full record or lower court determination is not a sensible exercise.”  A 
claim or an issue is “pressed or passed upon below” when it fairly appears in 
the record as having been raised or decided. 
19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 205.05[1], at 205–55 (3d 
ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 
(1992) (quoting Lytle v. Householf Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n.3 (1990))); accord 
ROBERT STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 344 (7th ed. 1993) (collecting 
cases); 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4036, 
at 9–10 (2002) (collecting cases). 
After stating the general rule, the Court in Singleton proceeded to say there is “no 
general rule.”  Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121; see also Martineau, supra note 29, at 1023, 
1044; infra notes 122–27 and accompanying text. 
 47. These include Rule 12(h), FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (stating that certain defenses 
waived if not raised at first opportunity), Rule 46, FED. R. CIV. P. 46 (stating that party 
must advise trial court of action requested and grounds therefor), and Rule 51, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 51 (stating that party must raise issues by instructions and objections). 
 48. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) 
(remanding the case because the parties had raised an issue not presented below); Hill v. 
California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971) (deciding a criminal case); Martineau, supra note 
29, at 1028–29.  But see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (deciding the case on a 
ground raised sua sponte by the Court); id. at 659–60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (pointing 
out that Justice White wrote flatly inconsistent majority opinions for the Court in Stanley 
and in Hill). 
 49. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 51 (requiring a timely objection to jury instruction); 
Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 903 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (stating that a claim for 
false arrest was not raised until after the judgment was waived, even though the facts 
were pleaded in the complaint); Carter, supra note 30, at 947.  An issue can also be 
presented too early to the trial court.  See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 566–67 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (deciding that when the trial judge makes the conditional or the 
tentative ruling on the pretrial objection, the party must renew the objection during trial 
to preserve the position for appeal). 
 50. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 276–77 & 276 n.7 
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carter v. Chicago Police Officers, 165 F.3d 1071, 
1077–78 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no civil plain error for jury instructions); Hartmann v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1216 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., concurring in 
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procedure, where appellate reversal for plain error is included in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure51 and is necessary to protect 
defendants’ rights.  As a logical matter, the absence of review for plain 
error is the flip side of the waiver rule; allowing plain error review 
would relieve parties of the consequences of their waivers.52 
2.  Arguments Not Raised in the Briefs Are Usually Treated as Waived 
Similarly, issues must be briefed in the appellate court or they will be 
treated as waived.53  The policy underlying that rule overlaps the policy 
in Singleton requiring that issues be raised in the trial court—it wouldn’t 
be fair to decide cases on issues where the parties had no opportunity to 
introduce evidence or make their best arguments.  As Justice Scalia (then 
Circuit Judge) wrote: “The premise of our adversarial system is that 
appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and 
research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and 
argued by the parties before them.”54 
3.  Justifications for the General Rule of Waiver 
In Singleton, the Court gave three reasons for the general rule.  First, 
the waiver rule makes it more likely the parties will offer all the 
evidence they believe relevant to the issues; if a party does not know an 
issue will be decided, it may choose not to offer evidence.55  Second, it 
prevents the court from making an uninformed decision, because the 
 
part and dissenting in part); Kensington Rock Island Ltd. P’ship. v. Am. Eagle Historic 
Partners, 921 F.2d 122, 125 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); Dillipaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 
322 A.2d 114, 177 (Pa. 1974) (abolishing the plain error rule in civil cases); see also 
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1052–55 (arguing strongly that the rationale of the plain 
error rule does not apply to civil cases because waiver concerns are present and because 
the integrity of justice concerns present in criminal cases are usually absent). 
 51. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30, and FED. R. CIV. P. 52, with FED. R. CIV. P. 46, 
and FED. R. CIV. P. 51, and FED. R. CIV. P. 61.  See generally 9A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2558, at 468–69 
(1995). 
 52. Plain error review is only available when errors have been waived.  If the error 
has been asserted below, no waiver has occurred.  See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1040 
(arguing that if the plain error had been pointed out to the trial court, it would have in 
many cases reached the other result (because the error was so plain), obviating the need 
for appeal). 
 53. Examples of such rulings are discussed infra notes 70–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 54. See, e.g., Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983); cf. Lebron v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 408 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the waiver rules rest upon a limited view of judicial power). 
 55. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).  A trial court may also preclude 
the introduction of evidence if an issue has not been raised. 
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court has no idea what evidence the party might have offered if it had 
been given an opportunity.56  Third, as a matter of fairness, parties 
should have the opportunity to present legal arguments on the issue 
decided.57  As noted above, there is a sense that “it would not be quite 
cricket” to place decision on a ground not raised until the oral argument 
on appeal, because the other party may have been lulled into presenting 
its case differently.58 
In addition to the adversary process, the waiver rule has been 
justified by the need for efficiency: waiver rules mean that the trial 
court’s effort is not wasted.  They also allow an appellate court to 
dispose of a case immediately—without more briefing, arguments, or 
remands.  In a time when courts complain about their dockets, this is 
an important factor.59 
 
 56. Id.; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329–30 & 329 n.8 (1989) 
(discussing the importance of notice and opportunity for argument prior to ruling on a 
dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and reserving ruling on propriety of trial court sua 
sponte dismissals under that rule). 
 57. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120; see also Schopler, supra note 29, at 949.  For other 
reasons for the general rule, see Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 720–21 
(10th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases); Carter, supra note 30, at 950; Martineau, supra note 
29, at 1028–34; Dennerline, supra note 29, at 986–88; Vestal, supra note 29, at 487–95. 
 58. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp., Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th 
Cir. 1996); see Miller, supra note 22, at 1050. 
 59. As Professor Martineau noted, waiver rules derive from the premise that rules of 
procedure are necessary to a final resolution of a dispute.  Waiver rules require parties to 
assert their rights and positions at the first opportunity.  Otherwise, parties can benefit from 
their own inaction, and cases may never end.  Martineau, supra note 29, at 1030–31.  The 
general rule prevents parties from inviting alleged error in the trial court (taking a chance 
they would win on another ground) and reversing their position in the appellate court (to 
make sure they would win on the ground where error had been invited).  See Michelle 
Lawner, Comment, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to Consider State 
Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1282–86, 1283 n.124 (1999) 
(citing Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393–98 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
The Tenth Circuit in Lyons also identified a number of ways in which concerns of 
waiver can arise: 
One is a bald-faced new issue.  Another is a situation where a litigant changes 
to a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general category as an 
argument presented at trial.  A third is a theory that was discussed in a vague 
and ambiguous way.  A fourth is issues that were raised and then abandoned 
pre-trial. A fifth is an issue raised for the first time in an untimely motion.  
These are all different aspects of the same principle that issues not passed upon 
below will not be considered on appeal. 
Lyons, 994 F.3d at 722. 
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4.  Expansion of the Waiver Doctrine 
Courts have expanded waiver in recent years.60  Courts now treat as 
waived even issues that were raised in the briefs, because they were not 
briefed with sufficient detail.61  Arguments in footnotes,62 of just one 
page or less,63 without citation of authority,64 incorporating briefs 
presented below,65 or presented for the first time in reply briefs66 or oral 
argument67 have been rejected.68  Even claims of waiver have been 
deemed waived because they were not raised at the first possible time.69 
 
 60. Perhaps this is a response to perceptions of court crowding or a reaction to 
judicial activism.  Courts hearing civil cases may also have been influenced by the 
rulings in postconviction cases that prisoners cannot challenge their convictions if issues 
were not raised in their direct appeals.  See, e.g., Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 
(1987); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486 (1986). 
 61. See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 172–73 (1958); JTC 
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 780–81 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that a novel theory was waived because it was insufficiently developed); Karibian v. 
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the issue was raised 
but not sufficiently developed); see also Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 
225, 230 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a party loses if the brief fails to “make a minimally 
complete and comprehensible argument” for each claim, regardless of the claim’s 
merits). 
 62. See Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 441–42 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a 
contention is waived when it is asserted for the first time in a footnote in a reply brief). 
 63. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1480 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that an issue that is stated but not argued is waived); Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 
1342 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that an issue that is stated in a single paragraph is waived); 
L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that an argument raised in one page without authority is waived); Leer v. 
Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that an issue is abandoned if it is 
raised but not supported by argument). 
 64. See Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 726–27 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that an argument that is unsupported by pertinent authority is waived); Mathis v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that even a pro se 
litigant must file an argument citing supporting authority); LINC Fin. Corp. v. 
Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 921–22 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the failure to cite 
authority constitutes a waiver); In re Maurice, 21 F.3d 767, 774–75 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the court will not do a party’s legal research). 
 65. See Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 141 F.3d 728, 740 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
the court will not consider an argument if it refers to arguments presented to the district 
court). 
 66. See, e.g., Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 597 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 67. See Frobose v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 612–13 (7th 
Cir. 1998); Bank of Illinois v. Over, 65 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (stating 
that a claim that discovery cutoff prevented the plaintiff from proving that the 
defendants’ employees knowingly placed a child whom was beaten in danger was 
waived because it was not raised in the brief). 
 68. The severity of the rule that arguments are waived if not properly developed is 
heightened by increasing insistence that parties adhere to strict page limits.  See Chicago 
Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 703–05. 
 69. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.); In 
re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1999) 
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B.  Under the Adversary Process Model, Waiver Can                             
Lead to Harsh Results 
But strict enforcement of waiver rules can lead to very harsh results.  
Three Seventh Circuit cases illustrate this point.  In each case, the facts 
were before the court, but the correct legal doctrine had not been argued. 
Two are discrimination cases, where plaintiffs with potentially 
meritorious claims lost because their lawyers advanced the wrong 
theory.  In Sanders v. Village of Dixmoor,70 a police officer was 
suspended by a new police chief with the words, “Nigger, you’re 
suspended.”71  The court ruled that the plaintiff’s discrimination claim 
had been waived because it had been erroneously argued as a harassment 
claim.72  In DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co.,73 a female lineman 
challenged her company’s practice of failing to provide a restroom for 
her to use during work performed outdoors.  The court ruled that her 
disparate impact claim was waived because she had only argued sexual 
harassment.74 
A classic case of the harshness of waiver—with a result even the court 
handing down the decision viewed as unjust on the merits—is Judge 
Posner’s opinion in Hartmann v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America.75  
In Hartmann, the court applied the waiver rule against orphans whose 
stepmother killed their father after bribing an insurance agent to defraud 
the orphans.  The orphans sued for fraud and equitable reformation of 
the policies.76  There was no question of guilt—the wife and insurance 
agent were convicted of mail fraud in connection with the murder.77  The 
Seventh Circuit held that the court could not grant reformation of the 
contract, but that fraud damages were theoretically available.  In oral 
 
(Posner, C.J.).  In recent years, courts have been willing to raise sua sponte procedural 
defaults in habeas cases even if the state has waived the argument by failing to raise it.  
See, e.g., Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 1998); Magouirk v. Phillips, 
144 F.3d 348, 357–60 (5th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); see also Calderon v. Thompson, 
523 U.S. 538, 547–49 (1998) (discussing the sua sponte recall of mandates in habeas 
cases). 
 70. 178 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 870. 
 73. 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.). 
 74. Id. at 436–37.  A dissent by Judge Rovner disagreed with the court’s sexual 
harassment ruling but did not challenge the waiver holding.  Id. at 437–40. 
 75. 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 76. Id. at 1208–09. 
 77. See United States v. Hartmann, 958 F.2d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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argument, however, the plaintiffs’ lawyer said—incorrectly—that 
reformation was required before damages were available.78  Because the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer did not argue the correct grounds, the Seventh Circuit 
applied waiver and refused to reach the correct result sua sponte.79  In 
discussing the applicable policies, Judge Posner wrote: 
We are not happy with this result.  This is a sympathetic case for the plaintiffs.  
But we cannot have a rule that in a sympathetic case an appellant can serve us 
up a muddle in the hope that we or our law clerks will find somewhere in it a 
reversible error.  One consequence of such an approach would be that prudent 
appellees would have to brief issues not raised or pressed by appellants lest the 
appellate court fasten on such a (non)issue and use it to upend the judgment of 
the trial court.  So briefs would be even longer than they are, and their focus 
even more diffuse.  Another consequence would be to diminish the responsibility of 
lawyers and to reduce competition among them, since the court would tend to 
side with the weaker counsel even more than it does anyway, at least when his 
was the more appealing case.  Our system unlike that of the Continent is not 
geared to having judges take over the function of lawyers, even when the result 
would be to rescue clients from their lawyers’ mistakes.  The remedy, if any, for 
the questionable tactical decisions apparently made by the plaintiffs’ counsel in 
this case lies elsewhere.80 
After explaining why the adversary process model requires waiver, 
Judge Posner acknowledged that courts sometimes have not followed 
that model, but explained why those cases were different: 
It is true that courts sometimes relieve parties from the consequences of their 
waivers, even if the case does not fall within one of the established exceptions 
such as those for issues of jurisdiction or comity.  We did that in a recent case 
where the defendant had waived an issue in the district court, but it was a pure 
issue of law fully briefed in our court and we could find “no reason to defer its 
resolution to another case.  There will be no better time to resolve the issue than 
now.”  This is not such a case.  Nor is it a case . . . where a court decides to 
reexamine a precedent so deeply entrenched in the law that a litigant might not 
think to challenge it . . . .81 
Judge Posner concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief 
from the waiver rule in Hartmann because the lawyer had told the 
 
 78. Hartmann, 9 F.3d at 1213–14. 
 79. The court stated: 
  We would not be disposed to hold the plaintiffs’ lawyer to a concession 
made in the distracting atmosphere of an oral argument.  But we have searched 
his briefs in this court in vain for any hint of an argument that the fraud case 
against Loochtan and Debra can survive the dismissal of the claim against 
Prudential.  There is nothing.  This is a case neither of a ground abandoned in 
the district court and sought to be revived here, nor of a ground pressed in the 
district court and abandoned here—and either would be a case of waiver. 
Id. at 1214.  Chief Judge Posner added that the plaintiffs’ counsel had his arguments 
“backwards.”  Id. 
 80. Id. at 1214–15.  Judge Cudahy dissented in part, preferring to apply a different 
agency rule.  He grudgingly accepted, however, that the plaintiffs had waived the fraud 
claim.  Id. at 1215–16. 
 81. Id. at 1214–15 (citations omitted). 
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appellate court he was not advancing what later proved to be the correct 
theory, “but the court’s independent research and reflection persuade the 
court that the lawyer is wrong.”82  The plaintiffs were bound by their 
lawyers’ mistake because: “If reversal on such grounds is proper, we no 
longer have an adversary system of justice in the federal courts.”83 
Hartmann cries out for a different result.  If there were ever a case 
where a strict application of waiver in private litigation seems 
inappropriate on its facts, it would seem to be a case involving orphans 
(whose father’s killing was arranged by their stepmother) suing an 
insurance company whose agent had been bribed.  The Hartmann judges 
seemed to share this view, but felt bound by doctrine.  What else could 
they have done? 
IV.  DOING JUSTICE, REGARDLESS OF THE PROCEDURAL STATUS 
A.  The Tradition of Equity and the Federal Courts 
Because judges also see their role as doing justice in the tradition of 
equity (or at least avoiding miscarriages of justice), courts frequently 
refuse to apply the waiver rule and instead raise issues sua sponte.  This 
theory of the judicial role is also consistent with portions of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The original theory of the Federal Rules was to create a more flexible 
system of justice.  Many provisions were deliberately designed to abolish the 
old forms of action and “theory of the pleadings” approaches of the 
English law courts.84  These provisions include Rule 15(b), allowing 
liberal amendments to conform to the evidence, even at or after trial, and 
Rule 54(c), allowing a court to “grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in the party’s pleadings.”85  Rules 15(b) and 54(c) are in 
 
 82. Id. at 1215. 
 83. Id. Judge Cudahy dissented in part, seeing no reason not to apply an agency 
rule contrary to that applied by the court because it was supported by prior precedent.  
He grudgingly accepted, however, that the plaintiffs had waived the fraud claim.  Id. at 
1215–16. 
 84. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1219, at 188–95 (2d ed. 1990).  Federal Rules “make[] it 
very plain that the theory of the pleadings mentality has no place under federal practice.”  
Id. at 190. 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c).  In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 authorizes the courts of 
appeals to reach a result that is just under the circumstances.  28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000).  
This has been used as justification in exceptional circumstances for bypassing the waiver 
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tension with strict application of waiver law and stand for an opposing 
principle—the courts’ desire to reach justice on the merits.86 
The adoption of the Federal Rules was followed by decisions 
endorsing the equity model.  A good example is Justice Black’s opinion 
for the Court in Hormel v. Helvering.87  There, the Court approved 
consideration of an issue not squarely presented before a trial court: 
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not 
to defeat them.  A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under 
which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances decline to 
consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged would 
be out of harmony with this policy.  Orderly rules of procedure do not require 
sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice.88 
This desire for justice was recently restated by Justice Stevens.  In 
Carlisle v. United States, he wrote that a judge is “more than a referee 
whose authority is limited to granting or denying motions advanced by 
the parties.”89  Quoting Learned Hand, he noted that a “judge, at least in 
a federal court, is more than a moderator; he is affirmatively charged 
with securing a fair trial, and he must intervene sua sponte to that end, 
when necessary.”90  Justice Stevens explained that every court of justice 
has a power “to correct that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of 
its process.”91 
B.  The Tension Between Doing Justice for the Parties and Stating 
Broad Rules for Future Cases 
In addition, courts are influenced by another dichotomy—the tension 
between deciding cases principally for the parties and the view that 
appellate courts should issue opinions that state broad rules of general 
applicability that will guide future conduct.  Both the desire to do justice 
and the idea of setting forth broad rules can lead judges to go beyond the 
issues presented by the adversary process. 
 
rule.  See Mitchell J. Waldman, Annotation, When Will Federal Court of Appeals Review 
Issue Raised by Party for First Time on Appeal Where Legal Developments After Trial 
Affect Issue, 76 A.L.R. FED. 522, 525 (1986). 
 86. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1030–31 (noting that justice requires a system 
of rules that the parties must obey). 
 87. 312 U.S. 552 (1941). 
 88. Id. at 557.  See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 993–94; see also Piper Aircraft 
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 246–47 n.12 (1981) (“We may consider questions outside 
the scope of the . . . order [granting review] when resolution of those questions is 
necessary for the proper disposition of the case.”). 
 89. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 437 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. (quoting Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir. 1933)). 
 91. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkadelphia Co. v. 
St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 146 (1919)).  Although the quote discusses a trial 
court’s power in a criminal case, the broad statement of principle was not so limited. 
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The adversary process model is focused on doing justice for the 
parties before the court.  As Justice Ginsburg (then Judge) wrote: “First, 
courts strive to ‘get it right’—to reach a correct result in the case at 
hand.”92  This is undoubtedly the view of almost all litigants.93 
As discussed above, within this focus the tension between enforcing 
procedural norms and doing justice leads courts to sometimes find 
injustice and to raise issues sua sponte.  But appellate courts are also 
affected by the view that their job is to provide broad rules for future 
cases.94  Focusing on judicial economy or the need to guide litigants in 
their conduct, courts will sometimes discuss issues that are not ripe, by 
strict procedural standards.95  Judge Posner expressed this view in his 
book about Justice Cardozo: 
It was a good point, well worth making, and more useful for the guidance of 
bench and bar than an interpretation of a particular contract.  Legal craft values 
in a traditional sense that emphasizes meticulous accuracy and an unwavering 
duty to place decision on the narrowest possible ground are here compromised 
in pursuit of a larger sense of judicial responsibility.96 
1.  Relaxing Procedural Rules to Decide Important Issues 
The disregard of procedural limits to articulate broad guidelines for 
future conduct is illustrated in several different types of cases.  It can be 
seen in cases that present issues that, while not raised sua sponte, would 
normally not be reached because they were not necessary to the 
decision.97  In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
 
 92. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 
206 (1985). 
 93. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 684–85; Krimbel, supra note 
27, at 930. 
 94. See Hartnett, supra note 22, at 124–27; Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of 
Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126–27 (1999) (arguing that 
the judicial function is to decide cases by issuing judgments). 
 95. Getting an issue right in the abstract is not necessarily the same as getting it 
right for the litigants in the case.  The author always becomes nervous when reading that 
an opinion has “simplified” the facts.  See, e.g., Fischbein v. First Chi. NBD Corp., 161 
F.3d 1104, 1104 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (“The facts are not in dispute, and we 
offer an abbreviated and simplified summary.”).  Cases are won or lost on those little 
facts.  See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 799. 
 96. POSNER, supra note 21, at 107. 
 97. For an unconvincing defense of deciding issues unnecessary to the decision, 
see John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional 
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999). 
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Sullivan,98 for example, the Supreme Court held that there was no state 
action, so 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was inapplicable.  The Court nevertheless 
reached the merits of a Due Process Clause issue.  The Court reasoned 
that it had granted review of the question, and added: “This question has 
been briefed and argued, it is an important one, and it is squarely 
presented for review.  We thus proceed to address it.”99 
A similar situation arises where the issue was not preserved but the 
Court nevertheless decides it.  In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 
Inc.,100 the Court acknowledged that the petitioner had failed to preserve 
an issue below by failing to make a timely objection.  The Court decided 
the issue because it was novel and important, had been briefed by the 
parties, and had been decided by the district court as an alternate 
holding.  The Court decided that it would further efficient judicial 
administration to decide the issue.101  The desire to issue a broad rule 
often influences courts to abandon traditional procedural norms and  
instead to reach out and decide issues not presented by a case or argued 
by the parties.102 
2.  Obiter Dicta 
The desire to guide future conduct also leads to obiter dicta, where a 
court reaches out to express an opinion on issues not before it.  In many 
cases, judges will spot an issue that has not been briefed, piously refuse 
to decide it, but then express an opinion.  Courts write what they know 
to be dicta to express their views on unbriefed issues. 
Authors of separate opinions frequently criticize unbriefed dicta.103  
 
 98. 526 U.S. 40, 50–51 (1999). 
 99. Id. at 59; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) (stating that the 
Court would consider a question that was fully briefed, important, recurring, and was 
pending in another certiorari petition, despite the fact that the question had not been 
presented below). 
 100. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 101. Id. 255–57.  Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the issue was 
waived.  Id. at 271–79 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Martineau, supra note 29, at 
1040–41 (arguing that if the issue is going to come up in another case anyway, there is 
no need to reward a party that waived it). 
 102. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 685; see also Krimbel, supra 
note 27, at 930 (noting the tension between a rehearing sua sponte and the goal of 
attaining justice for particular litigants). 
 103. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 221 
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court should not pass on the important 
question of federalism that was not briefed or argued, even in dicta); United States Dep’t 
of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 736–37 (1990) (Brennan, J., separate statement) 
(stating that a court should not sua sponte and without briefs and arguments address a 
standing issue that is not necessary to the result); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
257 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 
45 F.3d 1124, 1134 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rovner, J., concurring); Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. 
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Many lawyers also take a dim view of dicta on unbriefed issues: “When 
the court expresses dicta on an issue that is unbriefed and not supported 
by a factual record, it necessarily expresses an opinion that is not fully 
informed.  Nevertheless, the dicta will influence the law in the district 
courts or state courts without being fully considered by . . . the court.”104 
Obiter dicta have been widely criticized as unreliable105 and violative 
of proper procedures, because dicta are not based on full briefing and 
have not received the court’s full consideration.106  Thus, it has always 
been the rule that when court opinions go beyond what is necessary to 
decide a case, the court’s views “may be respected, but ought not to 
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is 
presented for decision.”107  When dicta are written, the court is less 
likely to fully consider the possible effect of the rule on all other 
cases.108  Accordingly, dicta are generally viewed as not providing a 
binding precedent,109 and will be more freely reversed.110  Nevertheless, 
 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 1986) (Flaum, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion for commenting on an issue 
that was neither briefed nor argued); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175–76 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (Sloviter, J., concurring); Stefanac v. Cranbrook Educ. Cmty., 458 N.W.2d 
56, 83 (Mich. 1990) (Levin, J., dissenting). 
 104. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 686. 
 105. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1536 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(Edmondson, J., concurring in the result) (“[D]icta is inherently unreliable for what a 
court will do once faced with a question squarely and once its best thoughts, along with 
briefs and oral argument, are focused on the precise issue.”); Michael Sean Quinn, 
Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication: An Irreducible 
Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 713 (1999). 
 106. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 
(1994). 
 107. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821). 
 108. Id. at 399–400; accord Santamorena v. Georgia Military Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 
1342–43 n.13. (11th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 
(3d Cir. 1996) (commenting that a statement in a prior opinion concerning an issue not 
briefed or argued on appeal is dicta and is not binding precedent); Bruns v. Ledbetter, 
583 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that “vagrant [appellate] observations 
about important questions” that sua sponte “went beyond the scope of the questions 
presented” are “wholly nugatory”); Roberts v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm’n, 869 
S.W.2d 139, 142–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that sua sponte comments in an earlier 
opinion were obiter dictum and were not controlling). 
 109. See, e.g., Watt v. Ann Arbor Bd. of Educ., 600 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1999).  But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388–89 & n.5 
(1988) (stating that a decision was not dicta just because the issue was not briefed and 
that even if it were dicta, the court is still bound by the view of the Federal Circuit). 
 110. See, e.g., Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582, 583–84 (Alaska 1963) 
(reversing an earlier sua sponte retroactivity ruling because dicta were not properly 
considered); Flax v. Kansas Tpk. Auth., 596 P.2d 446, 449 (Kan. 1979) (stating that 
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courts often wish to guide future conduct, and write dicta despite the 
rule.111 
In writing dicta instead of a holding, the court at least pretends to 
abide by the waiver rule, which precludes the court from deciding the 
issue.112  Nevertheless, the court views the issue as too interesting to 
deprive the world of its views, even if its views do not have the benefit 
of briefs and have no controlling legal effect.113 
C.  Doing Justice by Clarifying What the Parties Presented 
Finally, there are situations where an issue is not fully briefed but is 
necessary to the decision.  This can occur when the court feels that the 
litigants have not raised the proper legal issues or identified the correct 
principle of law.114 
1.  Courts Frequently Will Cite to Precedent that the Parties                  
Have Not Raised 
The Supreme Court has ruled that appellate courts are free to decide 
pure questions of law by citing to precedent not cited to the trial court.115  
As Judge Posner elaborated: 
 Judges are not umpires, calling balls and strikes; or judges of a moot court, 
 
dicta are not binding upon the court after it has opportunity for further enlightenment by 
briefs and arguments). 
 111. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46–48 (1994) (arguing that 
dicta may have greater weight if it was fully considered by the court, even if it turned out 
not to be necessary to the decision). 
 112. See United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1280–81 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Posner, J.) (commenting sua sponte on an antitrust issue; noting that the 
government had not raised the issue and therefore had waived it). 
 113. The Rockford Memorial case is a good example of this as well.  Id. 
 114. Williams-Guice v. Bd. of Educ., 45 F.3d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“[L]itigants’ failure to address the legal question from the right perspective does not 
render us powerless to work the problem out properly.  A court of appeals may and often 
should do so unbidden rather than apply an incorrect rule of law to the parties’ 
circumstances.”).  After citing this language, Eric Miller added:  
  Judge Easterbrook’s observation reflects the fact that courts are properly 
concerned with more than just the interests of litigants.  The adjudication of 
cases generates precedents and clarifies the law, providing benefits to everyone 
in society.  The precedent-generating function of courts is inhibited when 
courts defer to parties’ incorrect statements of the law rather than declare 
which legal principles in fact govern the case.  Moreover, courts have a valid 
interest in preserving their own institutional prestige and legitimacy, both of 
which are reduced when courts decide cases based on incorrect principles of 
law. 
Miller, supra note 22, at 1048 (footnotes omitted). 
 115. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–14 (1994). 
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awarding victory to the side that argues better . . . .  Appellate courts do rely on 
counsel to present the grounds for reversal, but in this country, unlike the 
practice in England, where the judges have no law clerks, they do not depend on 
counsel to find all the cases and all the reasons in support of the appeal.  The 
better lawyers resent this, feeling that it is “unfair” for judges to do the work of 
the weaker lawyers.  But that is the way it is . . . .116 
2.  Reframing Issues Pending Before the Court 
The Supreme Court has not limited appellate courts to citing new 
precedent—it has ruled that appellate courts can reframe the legal 
theories posed by the parties, in order to ensure that the law is correctly 
decided.  As the Court wrote in United States National Bank of Oregon 
v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.: “[w]hen an issue or 
claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the 
particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the 
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of 
governing law . . . .”117  The court noted that prohibiting the appellate 
court from reframing the issues would allow the parties to force the court 
to misstate the law by agreeing on the legal issue presented.118  This 
could lead to the opinion of a court on hypothetical acts of Congress or 
dubious constitutional principles.  Accordingly, the Court said it was 
proper for a court to decide that a law had been repealed—even though 
that issue had not been raised: “[A] court may consider an issue 
‘antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of ‘the dispute before it, 
 
 116. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); accord 
Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (“A court 
should apply the right body of law even if the parties fail to cite their best cases.”).  It is 
difficult to reconcile Judge Posner’s opinion in Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. and 
his observation in Smith.  Compare Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay 
Hosp., Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that it “would not be quite cricket” to 
rest a ground of decision on a ground not raised until oral argument on appeal), with 
Smith, 59 F.3d at 665 (stating the view that “[j]udges are not umpires”).  Perhaps it has 
something to do with the difference between cricket and baseball.  For more discussion 
of the metaphor of judges as umpires, see Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he 
Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 813, 832–35 (1996). 
 117. United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 
439, 446–47 (1993) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) 
(alteration in original)).  In Kamen, the Court said that reframing the issues is permitted, 
but not required; an appellate court has discretion to treat an issue as waived and deprive 
the party of unfavorable precedent when the party does not raise the issue or precedent in 
a timely fashion.  Kamen, 500 U.S. at 100 n.5. 
 118. United States Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 447. 
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even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief.”119  Furthermore, the 
Court stated that a court “need not render judgment on the basis of a rule 
of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply 
because the parties agree upon it.”120 
Raising cases not cited by the parties is an easily understood exception 
to the adversary process model.  Reframing the legal theories to ensure 
the law is correctly decided takes the court’s inclination to do justice a 
little further.  It can often be difficult to see the line between new 
theories and new points.121  Nevertheless, a rule that appellate courts will 
reframe issues but not raise new ones is a distinction that is still tethered 
to seeing that the law is correctly stated and applied.  But the Supreme 
Court has not stopped there. 
D.  Going All the Way: The Gorilla Rule 
In Singleton122 the Supreme Court discussed when questions may be 
raised on appeal for the first time (not necessarily sua sponte).  After 
stating the general rule that such issues will not be considered, the Court 
then said there was no general rule, and announced what Professor 
Martineau referred to as the “gorilla rule” (based on the old joke about 
where a 500 pound gorilla can sit):123 
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on 
appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be 
exercised on the facts of individual cases.  We announce no general rule.  
Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified 
in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is 
beyond any doubt or where “injustice might otherwise result.”124 
After Singleton, the general rule is that issues will not be taken up for the 
first time on appeal, except there is no general rule.  Instead, the Court 
promulgated the gorilla rule—that an issue can be raised for the first 
time on appeal if it is a really easy issue or if “injustice might otherwise 
result.”125 
 
 119. Id. (quoting Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)). 
 120. Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment)).  See generally Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 622 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e are not 
bound to decide a matter of constitutional law based on a concession by the particular 
party before the Court as to the proper legal characterization of the facts.”); see also 
Miller, supra note 22, at 1045–47. 
 121. See Campbell, supra note 29, at 97–98. 
 122. See supra notes 43, 54–55 (discussion of the Singleton case). 
 123. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1023. 
 124. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). 
 125. Id. 
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Following the gorilla rule, the Court has said that even if an argument 
is not pressed before it, the Court will feel free to review an issue if the 
issue was passed on below.126  Going a step further are Supreme Court 
cases that state that once a federal claim is properly presented, a party 
can make any argument in support of that claim, and is not limited to the 
precise arguments made below.127 
E.  The Gorilla Rule at Work: Areas Where Courts Have                             
Acted Sua Sponte 
Despite the difficulty, some lower courts have tried to articulate neutral 
principles explaining when matters should be considered sua sponte.128 
But reviewing the types of cases in which the Supreme Court and lower 
courts have acted sua sponte makes it difficult to articulate consistent 
general principles for sua sponte action—other than the gorilla rule.129  
 
 126. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995) (citing United 
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992)); see also Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 29 
(1984) (relying on the briefs below even though the issue was not briefed in the Supreme 
Court); STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 344.  Indeed, in Williams, the Court said that a 
point just had to have been mentioned by the court below as a settled rule of law.  The 
Court found it important that the United States had argued the point in a prior case 
below, even though it had not been argued in Williams.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 43–45. 
 127. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J.) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 
U.S. 519, 534 (1992)). 
 128. A typical formulation is in Hardiman v. Reynolds: 
  Generally, where the parties have not raised a defense, the court should 
not address the defense sua sponte. . . . 
  However, this general rule contains at least two important exceptions.  
First, a court must raise a defense sua sponte if that defense implicates the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  Second, as noted by the Third Circuit, 
where a “doctrine implicates [nonjurisdictional] values that may transcend the 
concerns of the parties to an action, it is not inappropriate for the court, on its 
own motion, to invoke the doctrine.” 
Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502–03 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 1987)).  Although Hardiman was 
a habeas case, the principles here were not limited to habeas actions; see also, e.g., City 
of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1101 (7th Cir. 
1992) (stating that the issues not argued below are waived “except in rare cases 
involving jurisdiction or if justice demands flexibility” (quoting Magicsilk Corp. v. 
Vinson, 924 F.2d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 1991))). 
 129. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1056–59.  One way of dealing with a sua 
sponte issue is to deny that it is being raised sua sponte.  As quoted above, the Supreme 
Court in United States National Bank of Oregon said that an appellate court is free to 
reframe issues in order to apply the proper construction of governing law and avoid 
deciding a hypothetical or dubious issue.  See discussion supra notes 117–20.  But on 
many occasions when courts act sua sponte, they do not try to characterize their action as 
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Examples of sua sponte action include the following types of cases.130 
1. Jurisdiction 
The most accepted ground for acting sua sponte is jurisdictional.131  
This is part of the rule that a court is always free to raise subject matter 
jurisdiction.132  As corollaries to the jurisdiction rule, courts often raise 
sua sponte prudential issues that are related to the courts’ power to act 
and related issues such as standing, capacity, and ripeness.133 
2. Limiting Federal Court Power 
Because of the increased concerns about the role of the federal courts 
 
just a different ground for review; they recognize that they are raising a new issue but 
point to some prior court decision that considered a similar new issue.  See Martineau, 
supra note 29, at 1034–35 & n.36 (collecting cases). 
 130. Allan Vestal pointed out that we will usually know that a court has decided an 
issue sua sponte only if there is a separate opinion raising the point.  Vestal, supra note 
29, at 497. 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 498–502; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346; 
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1045–46 (collecting cases); Campbell, supra note 29, at 
100–04; Lawner, supra note 59, at 1282–86; Miller, supra note 22, at 1040–41 
(collecting cases); Schopler, supra note 29, at 950–65.  A court’s having subject matter 
jurisdiction can be seen as a precondition to Professor Martineau’s general rule.  See 
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1047. 
 132. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 896 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (stating that a subject matter jurisdiction defect must be noticed by the court 
sua sponte at any point in litigation).  While a court will raise the absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction sua sponte, many federal courts will not raise sua sponte a point that 
will create jurisdiction.  See Perry R. Pennington Co. v. T.R. Miller Co., 994 F.2d 390, 
392–93 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing to take action to correct judgment under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(c), which would restore appellate jurisdiction, because the court 
had thought of it and counsel had not asked); cf. Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assocs., 
101 F.3d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (refusing to give lawyers another 
chance to allege facts showing diversity jurisdiction). 
 133. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (stating 
that courts may raise ripeness issues sua sponte, whether as a matter of jurisdiction or as 
a prudential matter); Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 488 n.4 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the court is obligated to raise standing sua sponte 
(citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977))); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the capacity to sue 
may be raised sua sponte when there is a question as to collusion in order to create 
federal jurisdiction, and remanding the issue for resolution of factual questions in the 
trial court); cf. Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995).  In Frietsch, Chief 
Judge Posner applied waiver to foreclose an argument arising from venue and forum 
selection clause rules.  Id. at 830.  A dissent suggested an exception was appropriate 
because the court’s result would leave the plaintiff with no remedy (due to German law) 
but would only allow the late raising of the argument where it would prejudice no one 
and where venue was similar to jurisdiction.  Id. at 831 (Shabaz, J., dissenting).  The loss 
of a valid claim did not move the majority.  Id. at 830. 
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in injunction cases, particularly cases involving state governments, 
federal courts raise comity or abstention134 or sovereign immunity135 
questions sua sponte, even if they have been waived.136  Similarly, 
federal courts have raised questions about the propriety or scope of an 
injunction or consent decree sua sponte.137 
3. Questions of Law 
Courts have said that they are more likely to raise pure questions of 
law, involving no fact-finding, sua sponte.138  There are also particular 
 
 134. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396 n.2 (1975) (ruling on an Eleventh 
Amendment question); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1390–92 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Miller, supra note 22, at 1044–45 (discussing courts’ willingness to consider issues sua 
sponte when they involve “nonjurisdictional doctrines of judicial restraint”); see also 
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134–35 (deciding a habeas case); Eaglin v. Welborn, 
57 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Posner, C.J.) (collecting cases) (stating that 
the Supreme Court has a more relaxed attitude on waiver in questions involving comity); 
ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 796–97 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (raising sua sponte 
the question of relations between governments and finding waiver inapplicable); 
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1050. 
 135. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1047–49.  For an argument that sovereign 
immunity questions should be treated as jurisdictional matters that should always be 
raised sua sponte see Lawner, supra note 59, at 1282–86.  The comment states strong 
policy reasons why raising sovereign immunity sua sponte would address the problem of 
states being allowed to litigate a matter in the trial court, see how it goes, then raise 
sovereign immunity on appeal.  Id.; see Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 
381, 393–98 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136. See Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 
468 U.S. 491, 500 n.9 (1984) (enforcing the waiver of a Younger abstention claim 
against a state attorney general); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515–16 
n.19 (1982) (declining to raise sua sponte an Eleventh Amendment issue that was waived 
and specifically not asserted at oral argument); id. at 524–25 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for applying the waiver doctrine); Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 
(7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (applying waiver to a prison warden and a state official 
because they failed to raise the issue, despite an intervening favorable opinion); id. at 
1128–30 (Ripple, J., concurring) (criticizing the court for applying the waiver doctrine 
aggressively in a case involving state sovereignty); Winston v. Children and Youth 
Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991) (following Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees, 468 U.S. 491). 
 137. McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 n.* (7th Cir. 1997) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating in dicta that the appeals court must act to vacate an injunction 
exceeding the district court’s power under Article III of the Constitution, regardless of 
waiver); ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 797–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.). 
 138. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1035–40 (collecting cases).  If a pure issue of 
law has been waived below but briefed in the appellate court, it will sometimes be 
considered.  Diersen v. Chicago Car Exch., 110 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1997) (“There is 
no reason to defer its resolution to another case.  There will be no better time to resolve 
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situations where courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte.  
These include the following: if the issue was posed by a new court 
decision since the lower court ruling139 to reconsider an existing 
precedent about which the court is concerned,140 if the questions are 
antecedent to the issues presented and dispositive of the dispute,141 or if 
the issue involves the retroactivity of the court’s decision.142 
4. Frivolous Cases 
Courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte in a frivolous case.143   
5. Important Cases 
Courts are also more likely to raise an issue sua sponte if they believe 
the issue involves a matter of important public concern.144 
 
the issue than now.” (quoting Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 750 (7th 
Cir. 1993))); see also Niedert v. Rieger, 200 F.3d 522, 527–28 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 139. Cf. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 62 F.3d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that waiver is flexible when a party asks remand to permit administrative agency 
to consider the intervening precedent).  But see Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 
1999) (Posner, C.J.) (applying waiver to a prison warden and a state official because they 
failed to raise the issue, despite an intervening favorable opinion); id. at 1128–30 
(Ripple, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court for failing to apply the waiver doctrine). 
 140. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645–46 (1961); United States v. Spears, 
965 F.2d 262, 282 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of a 
hearing en banc concerning the court’s sua sponte decision to revise the standard of 
appellate review of probable cause cases); United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 250–53 
(5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing 
the court’s sua sponte decision to revise the standard for the insanity defense, despite the 
parties’ failure to argue the issue); see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing for reexamining 
sua sponte the validity of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)). 
 141. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36–38 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)). 
 142. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (deciding a habeas case (citing 
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 261–62 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (deciding a 
habeas case))); cf. Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582, 583 (Alaska 1963) 
(stating that the retroactivity discussion in the initial opinion was obiter dictum because 
the issue was not briefed, and then reaching an opposite result after briefing). 
 143. In Lucien v. Johnson, the court reached the merits sua sponte even though they 
had not been briefed.  There, the state defended a suit involving a claim by a state 
prisoner of lost property on the grounds of mootness.  The court ruled the case was not 
moot but viewed the merits as so frivolous that there was no point in further 
consideration, “for we are sure that [the plaintiff] has no claim.”  Lucien v. Johnson, 61 
F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.). 
 144. See William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The 
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 736–
39 (2000) (stating that the federal circuit has acted inconsistently in considering issues 
sua sponte, apparently based on its perception of the importance of the issue); Schopler, 
supra note 29, at 965–66 (collecting cases).  This factor may also have motivated the 
Fourth Circuit to raise the reconsideration of Miranda in United States v. Dickerson.  166 
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6. To Avoid Plain Error 
Despite its inconsistency with the waiver rule,145 some courts do apply 
plain error to civil cases and use the doctrine to avoid applying a strict 
theory of waiver.146  Indeed, despite the waiver rule, the Supreme Court 
reserves for itself the right to review plain error.  Supreme Court Rule 
24(1)(a) provides that at its option, “the Court may consider a plain error 
not among the questions presented but evident from the record and 
otherwise within its jurisdiction to decide.”147  Even courts that normally 
claim they will not apply the plain error doctrine, or courts that apply it 
strictly, will recognize exceptions to the rule.148 
 
F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see generally, e.g., Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Point/Counterpoint: The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the 
Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (2000). 
 145. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 999–1001 (questioning whether the plain 
error standard as applied is meaningful); Navarro, supra note 29, at 1196–1208 
(discussing the split in circuits); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 51, § 2558, at 456–69. 
 146. See, e.g., Holmes v. Texas A&M Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 685–86 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Highlands Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 27 F.3d 1027, 1031–32 (5th Cir. 
1994)); Chute v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 143 F.3d 629, 631 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., 131 F.3d 1120, 1123–24 (5th Cir. 1997); see also In re 
Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 631 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing civil plain error, but 
possibly envisioning a standard harsher than in criminal cases); Jeffrey R. Teeters, Case 
Note, Internal Consistency of Ohio Jury Interrogatories, O’Connell v. Chesapeake & 
Ohio Railroad, 569 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1991), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 373–74 (1992) 
(noting that Ohio courts apply plain error in criminal cases). 
 147. SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(a).  The placement of this sentence in a section on briefs 
suggests that it may not extend to issues not briefed.  The Court may not, however, feel 
such a limitation.  See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 & n.9 (1976); see 
also STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346; Schopler, supra note 29, at 970–75.  Of course, 
there is no evident principle as to when the Supreme Court will find a plain error and 
when it will not.  See STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346 (“To an outsider the errors in 
those cases seem no more ‘plain’ than other errors not corrected by the Court; indeed in 
each of the above cases several Justices dissented.”). 
 148. See Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (utilizing civil plain 
error only to avoid a miscarriage of justice or for error that seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings); Poindexter v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing 
civil plain error for miscarriage of justice or instructions that are “patently plainly 
erroneous and prejudicial” (citing Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 
738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 585 (1985))); Pa. Envtl. Def. 
Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 
civil plain error may be sparingly applied for a “serious and flagrant error that 
jeopardized the integrity of the proceeding,” such as a “clear deviation from an 
established legal rule”); Walden v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 520–21 (3d Cir. 1997); 
McKinney v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 113 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that plain 
error is only available for questions of subject matter jurisdiction); Stringel v. Methodist 
Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 89 F.3d 415, 421–23 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that plain error is 
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7. When the Issue Has Already Been Mentioned 
Courts are more likely to raise an  issue without full briefing if it has 
been raised by amici, particularly if there has been some briefing or 
argument on the subject.149   
8. When There Is Little Additional Work Involved 
Courts are more likely to decide a new issue without briefing if there 
is little additional work involved.150 
9. To Affirm the Judgment Below 
Courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte to affirm the 
judgment below, than to reverse it.151 
10. Because the Case Is Before Trial 
Courts have decided a new issue sua sponte because the case is before 
trial and raises a potential claim that should be fully considered.152 
 
reserved for “the truly extraordinary case”); Prymer v. Ogden, 29 F.3d 1208, 1214 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (stating that plain error may only be treated as open if exceptional 
circumstances exist, substantial rights are affected, and in order to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice (quoting Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1362 (7th Cir. 1988))); see also Amcel 
Corp. v. Int’l Executive Sales, Inc., 170 F.3d 32, 34–37 (1st Cir. 1999) (distinguishing 
among raised issues, deliberately waived issues, and issues not waived in connection 
with the appellate court’s decision to address an issue not preserved, and finding that 
plain error exists in civil cases under Federal Rule of Evidence 103). 
 149. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457–58 n.* (1994) (deciding a 
criminal case and stating that the Court will consider arguments raised in amicus brief, 
but chose not to do so because it involved a statute and the United States had declined to 
take a position); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 108–110 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 
(1961).  But see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 523 n.10 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases) (criticizing the Court for deciding the case on a ground 
advanced by amicus curiae and not by the party); Batson, 476 U.S. at 117 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960) (stating that if a 
point made in an amicus brief has never been advanced by petitioners, the Court has no 
reason to pass upon it)).  See generally STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 344–45 (stating 
that the Court’s position on deciding issues raised only in amicus brief is “fluid and 
unpredictable”). 
 150. Vestal, supra note 29, at 510. 
 151. The Supreme Court is more likely to raise an issue that was not presented for 
review by the petitioner if it has been asserted by the respondent as an alternate ground 
for affirmance.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 109 (Stevens, J., concurring).  But see id. at 
116–17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  See generally Vestal, supra note 29, at 506–07. 
 152. See Lang v. Bank of N.D., 423 N.W.2d 501, 502–03 (N.D. 1988); see also 
United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) 
(deciding a criminal case), vacated by 531 U.S. 1135 (2001). 
There is . . . no rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which 
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11. To Protect Pro Se Litigants 
A few courts have raised an issue sua sponte to protect a pro se 
litigant.153  However, this seems out of fashion at the moment. 
12. To Determine Facts 
A recent article argues that the Supreme Court often determines facts 
on its own.154 
13. In the Interests of Justice 
Courts have decided cases sua sponte to avoid a “miscarriage of 
justice” or to prevent a result “inconsistent with substantial justice.”155 
Unfortunately, these phrases are almost meaningless, because any time 
the new issue would affect the result, it could be a miscarriage of justice 
for the party that lost below not to be permitted to raise the issue.156 
 
courts of review invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all 
questions which have not previously been specifically urged.  Indeed there 
could not be without doing violence to the statutes which give federal appellate 
courts the power to modify, reverse or remand decisions as may be just under 
the circumstances.  Exceptional cases or particular circumstances may prompt 
a reviewing court, where injustice might otherwise result or where public 
policy requires, to consider questions neither pressed nor passed upon below. 
Id. (quoting Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1961) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added). 
 153. See Gramegna v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 675, 677–78 (11th Cir. 1988) (suspending 
the rules and raising a matter sua sponte to protect a pro se litigant). 
 154. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly 
Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 333–51 (1999) (stating 
that the Supreme Court’s fact-finding has gone beyond judicial notice in a variety of 
contexts). 
 155. Estate of Vak v. Comm’r, 973 F.2d 1409, 1412 (8th Cir. 1992); see Waldman, 
supra note 85, at 64 (collecting cases) (applying standards like “whenever public interest 
or justice so warrants”). 
 156. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1041–42; see also Campbell, supra note 29, 
at 175–76.   
[C]ommon sense supports the proposition that this court will not decline to 
consider a proposition of law that goes directly to the merits of the entire case, 
though the question was never presented to or determined by the trial court.  
Otherwise a result absolutely unwarranted by law might have to stand, and 
great injustice follow. 
Id. (quoting Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Sprague, 167 N.W. 124, 125 
(Minn. 1918)). 
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14. Because the Issue Is Related to Another Issue Before the Court 
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association,157 the Court decided a 
question that had not been briefed, had not been addressed below, and 
that the parties agreed was not before it.158  Over a vigorous dissent by 
Justice Stevens,159 the Court justified its procedure by saying that the 
issue decided was “intimately bound up” with the Court’s discussion and 
was “easily subsumed within the question on which we granted 
certiorari.”160 The Court added: “The Court has not always confined 
itself to the set of issues addressed by the parties.”161 
15. For No Reason at All 
In United States v. Feola,162 the Court decided a question163 that was 
not presented in the certiorari petition, was not briefed or argued, and 
was squarely presented in the certiorari petition in another case pending 
at the same time.164  Justice Stewart, dissenting, asked why Feola could 
not have been held until after certiorari was granted in the second case 
and after it was argued and decided.165  The Court’s only response was 
that “we are not always guided by concessions of the parties, and the 
very considerations of symmetry urged by the Government suggest that 
we first turn our attention” to this issue.166 
*   *   *   *   * 
All of these cases exist side-by-side with the waiver cases.  They are 
hopelessly irreconcilable with them. 
 
 157. 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (considering the circumstances where punitive damages 
could be awarded under Title VII, and deciding not to apply common law agency 
principles to punitive damages). 
 158. Id. at 552–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Respondent’s counsel had stated at oral 
argument that: “[W]e all agree . . . that that precise issue is not before the Court.”  Id. at 
552. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 540. 
 161. Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 and n.1 
(1998)); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243–249 (1989); Cont’l 
Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 667–75 (1935). 
 162. 420 U.S. 671 (1975). 
 163. The question was whether an assault on a federal officer violates 18 U.S.C. § 
111 even when the assailant is unaware that the victim is a federal officer.  Feola, 420 
U.S. at 696–97 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 164. See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Fernandez v. United States, 420 U.S. 
990 (1975)). 
 165. Id. at 697 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“This conspicuous disregard of the most 
basic principle of our adversary system of justice seems to me indefensible.”). 
 166. Id. at 677. 
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F.  Courts Exercise Almost Unbridled Discretion in Deciding Which 
Issues to Raise Sua Sponte 
In summary, apart from questions of jurisdiction, courts are more 
likely to raise an issue sua sponte if they think a case is really important 
or if the judges really want to reach a particular result.167  This, of 
course, poses dangers, depending on the political views and restraint of the 
judges.168  Why did the Seventh Circuit apply the waiver doctrine harshly 
to orphans in Hartmann and to victims of discrimination in Sanders and 
DeClue, but not to the states opposing partial birth abortions in Hope 
Clinic or to the corporate demand requirement in derivative actions in 
 
 167. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1004–05 (stating that there is no discernable 
set of guidelines between or even within circuits as to when a new issue raised by parties 
should be heard); see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 257 n.15 
(1981) (implying that the Court can disregard procedural norms and consider issues that 
would normally be considered waived whenever it feels it appropriate); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (suggesting that the plain error provision of then 
Supreme Court Rule 40(1)(d)(2) permitted the Court to raise sua sponte a plain error not 
presented).  See also Justice Powell’s rather odd comment in Robbins v. California: “The 
parties have not pressed this argument in this case and it is late in the Term for us to 
undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines.”  Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420, 435 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).  Is sua sponte reconsideration 
acceptable earlier in the Term? 
 168. Compare Judge Easterbrook’s sua sponte raising of a new issue in Hope Clinic 
v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 1999), with the opinion of the court in Sanders v. 
Village of Dixmoor, 178 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1999), where he provided the decisive vote.  
See supra text accompanying notes 70–72.  Also compare Chief Judge Posner’s criticism 
of the Hope Clinic majority with his dissent in Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 
905 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).  The Kopec majority charged Chief Judge 
Posner with raising a number of issues not raised by the parties.  Id. at 902 n.5; see also, 
e.g., Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that a claim of 
retaliation in employment was waived because the employee only raised a harassment 
claim). 
It is also difficult to reconcile the views of Judges Posner and Easterbrook on waiver 
and raising issues sua sponte with their tendency to deny parties leave to amend the 
complaint or raise new issues after discovery.  Compare Eckstein v. Balcor Film 
Investors, 58 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Years into a complex piece of 
commercial litigation, a district judge is entitled to treat the issues as frozen.”), with  
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1347 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, 
J.) (creating sua sponte federal common law of demand on corporate directors), rev’d, 
500 U.S. 90 (1991); compare Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 903 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, 
C.J.) (stating that a claim for false arrest was not raised until after judgment was waived, 
even though facts were pleaded in the complaint), with Goodhand v. United States, 40 
F.3d 209, 214 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff’s 
lawyer in the heat of argument did not mention any other alleged act of negligence 
should not be held against him). 
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Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.?169  Why did the Supreme 
Court raise and decide issues sua sponte in Mapp, Washington v. Davis, or 
Erie Railroad, but refuse to address them in so many other cases?  It is 
hard to reach any conclusion but that sua sponte decision of new issues 
has been subject to the gorilla rule of unbridled discretion.170 
If we are left with courts acting based on their sense of injustice in 
each case, exercising unbridled discretion, what happens to the idea of a 
rule of law that includes procedural norms?  As Judge Easterbrook said: 
Legal rules committing decisions to judicial discretion suppose that the court 
will have, and give, sound reasons for proceeding one way rather than the other.  
“We must not invite the exercise of judicial impressionism.  Discretion there 
may be, but ‘methodized by analogy, disciplined by system.’  Discretion without a 
criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness.”171 
In fact, if courts can decide issues that parties have not raised or 
addressed, are the parties receiving due process of law? 
V.  DO SUA SPONTE DECISIONS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS? 
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether an appellate 
court must give parties the opportunity to brief a new issue before 
 
 169. 908 F.2d 1338, 1347 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruling sua sponte and creating a federal 
common law of demand on corporate directors); see also supra notes 15–16, 69–81. 
 170. See Martineau, supra note 29, passim; STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346 
(“The exception from the normal rule is not circumscribed by any particular formula, and 
that it reflects the Court’s discretionary authority to dispose of cases in what it 
determines to be the most sensible and reasonable way.”). 
[T]he theory [of the plain error exception] has never developed into a 
principled test, but has remained essentially a vehicle for reversal when the 
predilections of a majority of an appellate court are offended. . . .  The theory 
has been formulated in terms of what a particular majority of an appellate court 
considers basic or fundamental. Such a test is unworkable when neither the test 
itself nor the case law applying it develop a predictable, neutrally-applied 
standard. 
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1033 (quoting Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 
A.2d 114, 116–17 (Pa. 1974). 
 171. York Ctr. Park Dist. v. Krilich, 40 F.3d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) (deciding a habeas case) and 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139, 141 (1921)); see also Calderon v. 
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 566–73 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting on a 
habeas decision and stating that because the abuse of discretion review is very 
deferential, a court of appeals’ decision to recall mandate sua sponte should be deferred 
to something approaching a clear error standard); People v. Kuntu, 720 N.E.2d 1047, 
1050–52 (Ill. 1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring) (using a rule that either errors 
affecting substantial rights will not be waived or the plain error doctrine involves stating 
conclusions and stating that a court must explain why a particular case justifies departure 
from procedural norms); Martineau, supra note 29, at 1033–34 (stating that plain error or 
interests of justice review of new issues on appeal is inconsistent with appellate process 
because each ignores precedent, turns only on the factors of one case, and makes 
predictability impossible). 
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deciding it.  Do sua sponte decisions—without opportunity for 
briefing—violate due process?  If not, are they, at a minimum, an abuse 
of judicial power? 
A.  Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard 
1.  The Basic Principles 
The Supreme Court wrote: “The core of due process is the right to 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”172  In most contexts, 
the Court has said that a meaningful opportunity to be heard requires that 
the hearing occur before the decision is made.  The basic cases in this 
line are Goldberg v. Kelly173 and Mathews v. Eldridge.174  Under 
Goldberg and Mathews, where a statute creates a right to receive 
benefits, due process requires a pretermination hearing before the 
benefits can be stopped by the government.175 
In subsequent cases, courts have looked to see whether a hearing prior 
to the initial decision is required for the decisionmaking process to 
comply with due process, or whether a hearing following the initial 
decision provides all the process that is due.  In United States v. James 
Daniel Good Real Property,176 the Court ruled that when property is 
taken by forfeiture, a hearing must precede the government seizure.177  
The Court said exceptions to the general rule of predeprivation notice 
and hearing could occur only in “extraordinary situations where some 
valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the 
hearing until after the event.”178  Determining whether a particular 
judicial remedy justifies an exception to the general rule of 
 
 172. Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998); see also Gosnell v. City of 
Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that notice and an 
opportunity to be heard is “due process in its proper sense”). 
 173. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 174. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 175. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59–61 (1999) 
(discussing the requirement of a statutorily created property interest in continued benefits 
before the right to a pretermination hearing accrues and construing Goldberg v. Kelly and 
Mathews v. Eldridge). 
 176. 510 U.S. 43 (1993). 
 177. Id. at 62; see also United States v. 20832 Big Rock Drive, 51 F.3d 1402, 1405 
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that absent exigent circumstances, the government must provide 
preseizure notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard). 
 178. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))). 
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predeprivation notice and hearing “requires an examination of the 
competing interests at stake, along with the promptness and adequacy of 
later proceedings.”179 
To make that examination, the Court looked to the three-part inquiry 
of Mathews v. Eldridge.  Under Mathews, a court must weigh the 
following three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through 
the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional 
safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the 
administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would 
impose.180  The governmental interest in efficiency is not a general 
interest but the interest in prompt action before a full hearing was 
possible.181  In weighing these factors, the James Daniel Good Real 
Property Court put the judicial thumb firmly on the side of predeprivation 
court hearings before a seizure: “[F]airness can rarely be obtained by 
secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . .  No better 
instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to 
meet it.”182 
The analyses in Mathews and James Daniel Good Real Property 
suggest that the due process issue is substantial.  Sua sponte decisions 
deny the parties a significant private interest—whatever the subject of 
the litigation.  They increase the possibility for error by a court because 
the court does not have the benefit of the parties’ views.  And providing 
notice and an opportunity to be heard may not substantially impair a 
court’s interest in efficiency. 
2.  Supreme Court Cases on Sua Sponte Action 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether sua sponte 
decisions violate due process, it has issued a number of rulings on 
related points (in addition to the decisions stating general due process 
principles). 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 56. 
 182. Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 
170–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (alteration in original)).  The Court continued: 
The purpose of an adversary hearing is to ensure the requisite neutrality that 
must inform all governmental decision-making. . . .  [T]he availability of a 
postseizure hearing may be no recompense for losses caused by erroneous 
seizure.  Given the congested civil dockets in federal courts, a claimant may 
not receive an adversary hearing until many months after the seizure. 
Id. at 55–56. 
FINALMILLER.DOC 2/3/2020  3:02 PM 
[VOL. 39:  1253, 2002]  Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1291 
a.  Sua Sponte Trial Court Dismissals May Violate Due Process 
The Court has addressed several issues concerning sua sponte 
dismissals by trial courts.  For example, the Court ruled that “before an 
absent class member’s right of action was extinguishable due process 
required that the member ‘receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard 
and participate in the litigation.’”183  In another case, the Court expressly 
reserved ruling on the “permissible scope, if any, of sua sponte 
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).”184 
The Court did hold that sua sponte dismissals do not invariably violate 
the due process clause in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.185  There, the 
Court held that a trial court is authorized, if the party to be dismissed had 
sufficient warning, to dismiss a case sua sponte as a sanction under Rule 
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In Link, the Court said 
that while due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
“this does not mean that every order entered without notice and a 
preliminary adversary hearing offends due process.”186  If the party has 
sufficient notice to recognize the consequences, advance notice and a 
hearing are not necessarily required.187  Furthermore, the Court added 
that the availability of Rule 60(b) relief “renders the lack of prior notice 
of less consequence.”188 
b.  Failing to Give a Party a Chance to Respond Violates Due Process 
In Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.,189 the Supreme Court ruled that due 
process was violated when a court added a defendant and entered 
judgment without giving the defendant an opportunity to file a 
 
 183. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) (quoting Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)). 
 184. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 n.8 (1989).  The holding of Neitzke, 
concerning the proper scope of sua sponte dismissals in in forma pauperis litigation, was 
overturned by statute.  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 
Stat. 1321 (1996).  See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(collecting cases). 
 185. 370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
 186. Id. at 632. 
 187. Id., quoted in Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust 
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994); accord, e.g., Claude E. Atkins Enters., Inc. v. 
United States, 899 F.2d 1180, 1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 188. Link, 370 U.S. at 632; accord Brent v. Bd. of Trs. of Davis & Elkins Coll., 311 
S.E.2d 153, 158 (W. Va. 1983). 
 189. 529 U.S. 460, 465–68 (2000). 
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responsive pleading.  The Court said that the “opportunity to respond” is 
“fundamental to due process.”190  The Court added that “[b]eyond 
doubt . . . a prospective party cannot fairly be required to answer an 
amended pleading not yet permitted, framed, and served.”191  Citing to 
Alice in Wonderland, the Court observed that “[p]rocedure of this style 
has been questioned even in systems, real and imaginary, less concerned 
than ours with the right to due process.”192 
c.  Appellate Decisions Reached Without Full Briefing Are                     
Given Lesser Weight 
As part of its ambivalence on sua sponte decisions, the Court has ruled 
that decisions reached without full briefing and argument have a lesser 
precedental value for purposes of stare decisis.193  But even Supreme 
Court Justices who have criticized deciding issues sua sponte have not 
always questioned the Court’s power to do so.  In Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,194 for example, Justice Souter 
criticized the Court’s earlier decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.195  In Church of 
the Lukumi, Justice Souter said the rule announced in the Smith decision 
was squarely addressed by neither party.  He added that “[s]ound judicial 
decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous 
defense’ of the issues in dispute and a constitutional rule announced sua 
sponte is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing 
and argument.”196  After noting that the Smith rule was unnecessary to 
the result, Justice Souter continued: 
 
 190. Id. at 466. 
 191. Id. at 467. 
 192. Id. at 468 n.2 (citing LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH 
THE LOOKING GLASS 108 (Messner 1982) (1978)). 
 193. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (collateral review). 
 194. 508 U.S. 520, 571–73 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (criticizing Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).  Smith was also criticized for its sua sponte decision in an 
article by Michael McConnell.  Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and 
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1113–14 (1990) (“The most important 
decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause in recent history . . . was rendered in a 
case in which the question was entirely hypothetical, irrelevant to the disposition of the 
case as a matter of state law, and neither briefed nor argued by the parties.”). 
 195. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 196. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 572 (citations omitted).  Justice 
Souter quoted Ladner v. United States, stating that the Court was “declining to address 
‘an important and complex’ issue concerning scope of collateral attack upon criminal 
sentences because it had received ‘only meagre argument’ from the parties, and the 
Court thought it ‘should have the benefit of a full argument before dealing with the 
question.’”  Id. (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173 (1958)). 
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While I am not suggesting that the Smith Court lacked the power to announce its 
rule, I think a rule of law unnecessary to the outcome of a case, especially one not 
put into play by the parties, approaches without more the sort of ‘dicta . . . which 
may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’197 
d.  Stanley v. Illinois: No Due Process in Stating a New                      
Rule on Due Process 
The most ironic sua sponte case is undoubtedly Stanley v. Illinois.198  
In Stanley, the Court required hearings, under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, before a state could terminate the parental 
rights of unwed fathers.  In ringing language, the majority said that 
considerations of efficiency alone cannot overcome the need for 
procedures to protect citizens from the overbearing concern for 
efficiency: 
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state 
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional 
adjudication.  But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and 
efficiency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the 
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile 
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and 
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and 
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.199 
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent criticized the ruling, inter alia, because the 
Due Process Clause argument had been neither briefed nor argued, but 
was raised sua sponte.  The dissent also criticized the Court for setting 
up straw arguments against its holding that had not been made by the 
state.  The Chief Justice did not, however, claim that the Court’s action 
itself violated due process.200 
 
 
 197. Id. at 572–73 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
Justice Souter continued: 
I do not, of course, mean to imply that a broad constitutional rule announced 
without full briefing and argument necessarily lacks precedential weight.  Over 
time, such a decision may become ‘part of the tissue of the law,’ . . . and may 
be subject to reliance in a way that new and unexpected decisions are not. 
Id. at 573 (quoting Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)); accord Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 404 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
Court’s prudence, but not its authority, in addressing a waived claim sua sponte). 
 198. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 199. Id. at 656. 
 200. Id. at 659–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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B.  Some Lower Court Judges Have Taken a Broad View of the Due 
Process Implications of Sua Sponte Decisions 
Some lower court opinions have gone further than the Supreme Court 
by suggesting that sua sponte court decisions can violate due process.  
Chief Justice Robin Davis (then Justice) of the West Virginia Court of 
Appeals, for example, recently argued that her court’s sua sponte award 
of attorneys’ fees, not requested by the parties, was a “fundamental 
violation of state and federal due process guarantees” because it 
occurred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.201  Her view is 
supported by cases which have suggested that sua sponte agency202 or 
trial court decisions of issues violate due process.203  This comes up most 
frequently when a trial court sua sponte dismisses a nonfrivolous 
complaint. 
Several courts have held that sua sponte trial court dismissals 
violate due process.204  In California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. 
 
 201. Maikotter v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 527 S.E.2d 802, 808–10 (W. Va. 
1999) (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 202. See Stoyanov v. INS, 172 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Board 
of Immigration Appeals decision of issue without notice to the party violated due 
process). 
 203. See Nolen v. Gober, 222 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that 
fundamental issues of fairness are raised when the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
decides an issue sua sponte); Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State, 711 So. 2d 
1246, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the “trial court denied [the law firm] 
due process when it sua sponte ruled unenforceable the contingent fee contract on which 
those liens were based, without notice and an opportunity for the parties and counsel to 
be heard”); Grissom v. Grissom, 886 S.W.2d 47, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the 
trial court’s imposition of sanctions sua sponte without notice and hearing violated due 
process); Storer Communications of Jefferson County, Inc. v. Oldham County Bd. of 
Educ., 850 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment sua sponte was a denial of due process); Brown v. Triple “D” 
Drilling Co., 585 P.2d 987, 990 (Kan. 1978) (stating that an order reinstating the case sua 
sponte deprives a defendant of due process). 
 204. See, e.g., Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1527–28 & 1528 n.45 (11th Cir. 
1995) (stating that a magistrate judge’s raising of exhaustion and procedural default in a 
habeas case sua sponte was improper).  “[T]o be afforded due process, [the petitioner] 
must receive notice of the court’s inclination to interpose the default, an opportunity to 
demonstrate ‘cause’ for the default and ‘prejudice,’ and, if material issues of fact are 
present, an opportunity to present his evidence.”  Id. at 1528 n.45; see also Roman v. 
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1990) (raising the dismissal issue sua sponte under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which provides due process when the plaintiff 
is given an opportunity to address the issue either orally or in writing); Holzer v. Jochim, 
557 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1996) (stating that the trial court deprived the party of due process 
by redetermining liability sua sponte without notice that issue would be decided); King 
v. Mosher, 137 N.H. 453, 629 A.2d 788, 790 (1993) (stating that the fundamental 
requirements of due process require that the party be provided with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before dismissal of the nonfrivolous complaint and applying the 
state due process clause, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15).  Compare section 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §105(a), which gives the bankruptcy court the power to act 
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Musick,205 for example, the Ninth Circuit cited to the rule that due 
process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard with “proceedings 
as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional 
protection is invoked.”206  The court held that it was error to dismiss a 
claim on the merits without notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to 
respond, noting: “The right to a hearing on the merits of a claim over 
which the court has jurisdiction is of the essence of our judicial system, 
and the judge’s feeling that the case is probably frivolous does not 
justify by-passing that right.”207  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, which 
has often issued its own decisions sua sponte, does not approve of the 
same practice by trial courts.  It has held that a trial court’s sua sponte 
dismissal deprives a plaintiff of notice and an opportunity to respond.208 
Other appellate courts have prohibited sua sponte trial court dismissals 
of nonfrivolous complaints, without reaching the due process issue.209  
The reasoning of these decisions is consistent with a ruling, under a due 
process analysis, that a party must have notice of the ultimate issue 
before being deprived of its day in court.210 
 
sua sponte.  See generally In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 205. Cal. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 206. Id. at 280 (quoting Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 
(1944)). 
 207. Id. at 281 (quoting Harmon v. Superior Court, 307 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 
1962)).  The court reserved ruling on whether a Rule 60(b) post-ruling motion was 
sufficient to make “the denial of prior hearing and other due process rights . . . harmless 
error.”  Id. 
 208. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74 F.3d 835, 836–37 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that the district court was required to give notice and an opportunity to respond 
before dismissing the complaint sua sponte): 
We have found that sua sponte dismissals without such procedures conflict 
with our traditional adversarial system principles by depriving the losing party 
of the opportunity to present arguments against dismissal and by tending to 
transform the district court into ‘a proponent rather than an independent 
entity.’. . .  [S]uch dismissals often create avoidable appeals and remands, 
draining judicial resources and defeating the very purpose for which sua 
sponte actions are employed. 
Id. (quoting Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1184 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 209. United States v. One 1974 Learjet 24D, 191 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that it was an abuse of 
discretion to raise procedural default in the habeas case sua sponte without giving the 
party notice and opportunity to respond before the decision); Porter v. Fox, 99 F.3d 271, 
273 (8th Cir. 1996) (deciding a habeas case); see Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 
1320–21 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Michael, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).  Note that 
the law in habeas cases has been changed by statute.  See, e.g., Benson v. O’Brian, 179 
F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 210. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (stating 
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C.  Some Courts View a Motion for Rehearing as Providing               
Sufficient Process 
Other courts believe there is no due process violation as long as there 
has been an opportunity for reconsideration.211  In an unpublished 
opinion, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a rehearing procedure satisfied the 
“bare minimum requirements of procedural due process” in a case 
involving the request of a prisoner to videotape his execution.212  Despite 
discomfort with the procedure, the court said: 
[W]e must acknowledge that the plaintiffs did, eventually, brief the issue of the 
constitutionality of the videotaping matter on the merits and that this 
opportunity to ask for rehearing, under these particular circumstances in this sui 
generis case, appear to have given the state court a reasonable opportunity to 
rectify its error in denying notice, and thus satisfied the bare minimum 
requirements of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.213 
These decisions are supported by decisions that hold that sua sponte 
trial court dismissals of nonfrivolous complaints do not violate due 
process.  There are also some decisions that suggest an intermediate 
standard, lower than frivolous—that trial courts can dismiss cases sua 
sponte if it is patently obvious that the plaintiff cannot obtain relief.214 
 
that the district court must give an opportunity to be heard before dismissing a 
nonfrivolous complaint sua sponte); Street v. Fair, 918 F.2d 269, 272 (1st Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam) (stating that the district court must give notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before dismissing nonfrivolous complaint sua sponte); Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 
1109, 1111–12 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that the sua sponte dismissal of nonfrivolous 
complaints is “not in accordance with our traditional adversarial system of justice,” and 
is “unfair to the litigants and ultimately waste, rather than save judicial resources”); 
Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 
1983) (stating that notice and an opportunity to be heard is required before dismissal on 
the merits of a nonfrivolous complaint); Lewis v. New York, 547 F.2d 4, 5–6 (2d Cir. 
1976); see also Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) 
(stating that a trial or appellate court must give notice before granting summary 
judgment sua sponte).  Not much notice is required however. 
 211. See also Harris v. Marsh, 123 F.R.D. 204, 218 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (“[T]o the 
extent imposition of the original reprimand and fine violated any due process right of 
counsel, by providing for reconsideration and seriously entertaining counsel’s 
arguments, due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard have now 
been satisfied.”). 
 212. Lawson v. Dixon, No. 94-6640, 1994 WL 258629, at **4 (4th Cir. June 13, 
1994) (unpublished opinion). 
 213. Id.  It is surprising that this opinion, with its unusual fact situation and its 
decision of a novel issue, was not published.  Cf. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 
898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated by 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 214. See, e.g., Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
sua sponte dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper when it is 
“patently obvious” that the plaintiff could not prevail); Baker v. Director, United States 
Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that the trial court can 
dismiss a case sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the claimant 
cannot possibly win relief). 
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VI.  WHAT SHOULD COURTS DO? 
From a legal realist’s perspective, “what process is due” is a 
tautology: as much process is due as the Supreme Court says is due.215  
In the author’s view, Chief Justice Davis was correct, however, when 
she argued that due process requires appellate courts to offer the parties 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard before an issue is decided.216  The 
Court’s analyses in Mathews v. Eldridge and United States v. James 
Daniel Good Real Property are fully applicable to sua sponte appellate 
decisions.217 
But whether or not sua sponte decisions violate due process, the 
principles of fairness upon which it is based suggest that a court should 
take the obvious course when it thinks the right issue has not been 
presented to it.  An appellate court should always ask for the parties’ 
submissions before ruling.218 
A.  Courts Raising New Issues Frequently Will Ask the Parties for 
Further Input Before Ruling 
There are two ways input can be sought: first, asking for supplemental 
briefing, and second, remanding for a new ruling by the trial court. 
1.  Asking the Parties for Supplemental Briefs 
Many courts routinely ask the parties for supplemental briefs when 
deciding a new issue.219  As Chief Justice Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court wrote: “[I]t is only fair that the appellate court direct the 
attention of counsel” to legal theories, cases, or other materials not 
covered by the briefs, “if it appears that they may affect the outcome of 
 
 215. Cf. Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, 
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 357 (1996) (noting that except for 
notice and hearing, the definition of due process is close to tautological). 
 216. Maikotter v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 527 S.E.2d 802, 808–10 (W. Va. 
1999) (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 217. See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text. 
 218. Accord William N. Early et al., USCMA and the Specified Issue: The Current 
Practice, 123 MIL. L. REV., Winter 1989, at 9, 22. 
 219. See id. at 26–27 (discussing the practice in several courts); United States v. 
Mussari, 168 F.3d 1141, 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (deciding a 
criminal case and stating the circuit’s practice of ordering supplemental briefing when it 
raises an issue sua sponte). 
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the case, and give them the opportunity to submit additional briefs.”220 
In 1997, the Supreme Court indicated a preference for requesting 
supplemental briefing when a court raises a new issue sua sponte.  In 
Trest v. Cain,221 Justice Breyer wrote the following dicta for the Court: 
We note that the parties might have considered these questions, and the Court of 
Appeals might have determined their relevance or their answers, had that court 
not decided the . . . question without giving the parties an opportunity for 
argument.  We do not say that a court must always ask for further briefing when 
it disposes of a case on a basis not previously argued.  But often, as here, that 
somewhat longer (and often fairer) way ‘round is the shortest way home.222 
Thus, the Court itself often directs supplemental briefing on issues it 
raises sua sponte, either when issuing the order accepting questions for 
oral argument,223 or after argument.224  Lower courts also frequently 
follow this practice.225  As Justice Ginsburg wrote about the District of 
Columbia Circuit: “The parties’ contentions ordinarily determine the 
issues to be addressed. If the panel or the opinion writer spots a 
potentially dispositive question not raised by the parties, the judges 
generally invite supplemental briefs, thereby affording the litigants a 
chance to have their say.”226 
Cases involving the decision of new issues after supplemental briefing 
 
 220. Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate 
Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 219 (1957); see also Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, 
Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 
558 (1977) (arguing that parties should have the opportunity to brief retroactivity before 
the issue is decided). 
 221. 522 U.S. 87 (1997). 
 222. Id. at  92 (stating that the district court is not required to raise a procedural 
default issue sua sponte in the habeas case if the state fails to raise the issue and 
declining to decide whether the Fifth Circuit was permitted to raise the issue sua sponte); 
see also John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 
183 (1982) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint teaches us that patience in the judicial 
resolution of conflicts may sometimes produce the most desirable result.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 115 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases); STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 245, 340 (collecting 
cases); cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 476 n.6 (1949) (asking the parties to brief 
an issue that had been raised by petitioner, but as to which the Court had not originally 
granted certiorari). 
 224. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 622–23 (1988) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting from order directing reargument); Batson, 476 U.S. at 115 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (collecting cases); STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 341 
(collecting cases); Krimbel, supra note 27, at 931–46.  The Court’s first use of the power 
to request rehearing sua sponte was an 1819 case where one of the Justices had been 
absent.  The first time the Court stated the power to request rehearing sua sponte when a 
justice “doubts the correctness of his opinion” was in Brown v. Aspden, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 25, 26–27 (1852).  See Krimbel, supra note 27, at 932–33. 
 225. See United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. 439, 448 
(approving the raising of new issues by the court of appeals and ordering supplemental 
briefing). 
 226. Ginsburg, supra note 92, at 214–15 (footnote omitted). 
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cover a range of areas.  The most frequent area is probably jurisdiction.227  
Other common grounds for supplemental briefing include the following:  
to address mootness;228 whether to overrule prior precedent;229 whether to 
consider an issue not raised below;230 to address an intervening statute,231 
ruling232 or precedent;233 to address a portion of an issue the court believes 
was not adequately briefed;234 to redecide a case together with new cases 
where certiorari has been granted;235 or prior to an award of sanctions.236  
 
 227. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1975); Shegog v. 
Bd. of Educ., 194 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.); United States v. Accra 
Pac, Inc., 173 F.3d 630, 631–32 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.); Union Oil Co. of Cal. 
v. John Brown E & C, 121 F.3d 305, 308, (7th Cir. 1997); Peters v. Welsh Dev. Agency, 
920 F.2d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Phillips, 844 F.2d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(supplemental letter briefs); Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 337 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
 228. See, e.g., Buckley v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 111 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 229. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 194–95 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for sua sponte 
ordering parties to address question concerning validity of prior precedent that they had 
not raised); Batson, 476 U.S. at 115 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (collecting cases where 
supplemental briefing was ordered to reconsider precedent); Busby v. Crown Supply, 
Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 834 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990) (ordering supplemental briefs on the issue to 
permit the en banc court to consider overruling prior RICO precedent). 
 230. United States Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 445, 448 (stating that the court of 
appeals acted within its discretion in raising the validity of the statute sua sponte and 
ordering supplemental briefing); Winston v. Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 
1385 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that after the supplemental briefing, the court would not 
consider the abstention issue that had been raised below but not appealed). 
 231. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d 
on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. D.F., 115 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering 
the parties’ supplemental statements submitted after remand from the Supreme Court). 
 233. See, e.g., Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 488 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling after 
directing the parties to file briefs on intervening precedent). 
 234. See, e.g., Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs. v. Shalala, 165 F.3d 
1162, 1164 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (ordering supplemental briefs to explore the 
purpose of regulation that was at issue in the case). 
 235. See United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957); see also Krimbel, 
supra note 27, at 934–37. 
 236. This is required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which requires 
notice from the court and a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the court issues 
sanctions sua sponte.  See, e.g., Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1309 (7th Cir. 
1988) (ordering supplemental briefing to see if all attorneys should be sanctioned for 
failure to advise the court of jurisdictional issues); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 
838 F.2d 600, 606–07 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (stating that sanctions comply with due 
process when they are issued after notice and briefing).  Rule 38 was amended after 
earlier sanction orders were issued without notice.  See Chicago Council of Lawyers, 
supra note 8, at 699–701. 
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The Supreme Court has also ordered supplemental briefing when the 
Court questions a legal point made by the court below that has not been 
challenged by the parties.237  In addition, the Court recently appointed an 
amicus curiae to argue for the position taken by the appellate court, when 
neither party defended that position in the Supreme Court.238 
2.  Spotting an Issue and Remanding to the Lower Court 
Another option is for a court to spot an issue that has not been briefed 
and, if the issue looks decisive, remand it for resolution in the first 
instance by the lower court.239  This is the most procedurally conservative 
approach to addressing a new issue and is the only one fully consistent 
with the usual rule that issues not raised below will not be considered on 
appeal.240  Remand protects the role of the district court, which may 
have useful light to shed on the issue. 
Courts often spot an issue and then remand when a new precedent or 
law has arisen since the lower court’s decision.241  Remand is also 
frequently used when new facts have arisen since the trial court’s 
decision.242  In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,243 for example, the 
Court noted that another case decided the same day244 raised a new issue 
not briefed or argued by the parties and unnecessary to the decision of 
 
 237. See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 129 (1987). 
 238. See Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 226 n.1 
(2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 239. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 
935–36 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding the issue for resolution in the trial court, and stating 
that the capacity to sue may be raised sua sponte when there is a question as to collusion 
to create federal jurisdiction); Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(remanding to the trial court for an inquiry on mootness following a sua sponte order 
directing supplemental briefing on mootness). 
In Chambers Medical Technologies of South Carolina, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 
1260 n.11 (4th Cir. 1995), the court was tempted to proceed to a ruling without briefing 
or a remand to “resolv[e] the legal uncertainty surrounding this issue and . . . conserv[e] 
the resources of the courts and the parties.”  The court decided, however, that because a 
party was entitled to defend its position, it would remand the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings on the issue.  Id; see also Lang v. Bank of N.D., 423 N.W.2d 501, 
502–03 (N.D. 1988) (reversing dismissal with a direction for the trial court to explore a 
statute not considered below). 
 240. See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text. 
 241. See, e.g., Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (new regulations); 
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264 (1970) (new precedent); Nicely v. McBrayer, 
McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, 163 F.3d 376, 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (new precedent).  But 
cf. Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.) (refusing to 
apply new precedent in a habeas case because the state was aware of the argument and 
could have raised it below and, perhaps, because the court thought the state’s conduct at 
trial was reprehensible). 
 242. See generally Benjamin, supra note 154. 
 243. 470 U.S. 729 (1985). 
 244. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828–35 (1985). 
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the issues presented to the Court.  The Lorion Court expressed no 
opinion as to its proper resolution and stated that the issue was open to 
the court of appeals on remand.245 
B.  The Arguments Against Ordering Supplemental Briefing                       
Are Not Convincing 
Ordering supplemental briefing and argument is not without its 
critics.  From one side, some judges and commentators view asking the 
parties to address an issue they did not raise as too intrusive into the 
adversary process.246  Justice Stevens has repeatedly criticized the 
Court for sua sponte raising an issue for further briefing, saying it 
interferes with the adversary process.247  Other judges view raising a 
new issue as fine, but see supplemental briefing as unnecessary.  They 
may believe that they know the law and do not need assistance, that they 
are in as good or better a position than counsel to address and resolve the 
issue, or that counsel in a particular case are not likely to add anything 
helpful.248  Judges have also expressed concern that the delays caused by 
supplemental briefing may outweigh the benefits.249 
There appear to be several reasons for the reluctance of appellate 
courts to give notice and an opportunity to be heard to appellate litigants 
who have missed what the court views as the decisive issue.  First, it is 
 
 245. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 735 n.8.  A variant of this approach is to address the issue 
in dicta, then to remand the case for further proceedings.  See Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 
1200, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (suggesting the lost-chance theory of 
damages in employment discrimination cases despite the fact that it had not been 
briefed).  This is not as pure as remanding the case for a decision in the first instance, 
without comment. 
Courts sometimes avoid waiver or the use of dicta by spotting an issue as relevant but 
deciding that it is not dispositive and leaving it for another day.  See, e.g., Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (stating that the issue raised 
by amici was not necessary to the decision and leaving it for another day).  This is a 
traditional role for a concurring opinion.  See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 
524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting important questions but 
suggesting resolution in a later case following full briefing and argument). 
 246. See Krimbel, supra note 27, passim. 
 247. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 248. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 689. 
 249. See Ellen A. Peters, Forum on Judicial Ethics, 66 NEB. L. REV. 448, 452 
(1987).  But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 110 (2000) (stating that the parties’ 
entitlement to an opportunity to be heard prior to when the Florida Supreme Court had 
issued statewide standards was of critical importance to the outcome of the presidential 
election).  The Supreme Court would not waive the opportunity to be heard below, even 
though (or some would say because) the presidential election was at stake.  See id. 
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more efficient not to order rebriefing.  It is more difficult for the judges 
to consider a case twice than to consider it once.  Some courts have 
reasoned that additional briefing takes time away from other matters the 
courts can consider.250  The efficiency concern is particularly strong for 
appellate courts that sit in rotating panels.  Next, courts may believe that 
lawyers have nothing to add on particular issues, because the judges can 
decide the law for themselves.  Furthermore, courts may believe that 
many lawyers are not likely to add anything useful because of a 
perceived lack of quality.251  Finally, the court may suspect that the 
parties ducked the issue for tactical reasons.  None of these grounds are 
persuasive. 
First, in many cases, briefing will sharpen the issue and lead to better 
decisions.  The adversary process may bring a perspective to legal issues 
that the court will miss—no matter how learned the judges are.252 
Second, even if the court knows the law better than the parties do, the 
parties know the facts better.  The results may not be fair to the parties 
without their factual input, because that input could affect the choice of 
the appropriate legal rule and its application to their case.  In addition, 
the parties may have presented different evidence if they had known the 
issue would be considered.  Without such notice, relevant facts may, or 
may not, be in the record.253 
Third, an issue may have been deliberately waived by a party for tactical 
reasons or other proceedings below may have affected the procedural 
status of the matter.  This may not always be obvious to the appellate 
court.254  Requesting supplemental briefs will allow the parties to advise the 
court of points in the record that affect the fairness of the result. 
Fourth, the court’s actions appear arbitrary if they are not based on the 
parties’ briefs.  This makes it more difficult for lawyers to advise their clients 
as to the likely outcome of cases—making it less likely that cases will 
settle.  It also makes it more difficult for businesses and individuals to 
order their affairs.255 
 
 250. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 688–90; id. at 797 & 
n.573 (discussing Chief Judge Posner’s view on the perceived crisis in the federal 
appellate courts). 
 251. See id. at 798 (reporting that Chief Judge Posner often expressed the view at 
oral argument that the lawyers’ briefs were not very helpful).  See also Smith v. Farley, 
59 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (“The better lawyers resent this, feeling 
that it is ‘unfair’ for judges to do the work of the weaker lawyers.”). 
 252. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 690; Martineau, supra note 
29, at 1038–39; Miller, supra note 22, at 1050. 
 253. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 685, 690; Martineau, supra 
note 29, at 1036–39. 
 254. For example, the briefs may not note every point that was raised or expressly 
waived below. 
 255. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 685 n.15; Martineau, supra 
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Fifth, it is not clear that sua sponte decisions cost the court more time, 
because the court may spend less time researching and considering the issue 
if it is briefed.256 This point was made by Justice Breyer in Trest v. Cain.257 
Sixth, and perhaps most important, parties and counsel may not 
perceive the court’s judgment as fair and legitimate unless they get their 
say before the court decides.258  As the authors of the leading treatise on 
Supreme Court practice have said: “[G]oing beyond the limited 
questions and resting decision on grounds not briefed or argued is unfair 
to the losing party.”259 
Finally, as to judicial efficiency, in the age of e-mail, fax machines, 
overnight mail, and telephone conferences, it does not take much extra 
time for judges to get together and discuss a case after supplemental 
briefing, even if they do not have chambers in the same city.  While 
courts do have to ration their time, they still need to spend enough time 
on each decision to make sure it is right, and that the result is fair.260 
That a court would usually reach the same result—even ninety-five 
percent or more of the time—without the supplemental briefing does not 
answer either the due process question or the issue of whether acting 
without supplemental briefing is fair.  Trial court judges would probably 
reach the same result most of the time without closing argument, or even 
without a trial, just on affidavits and a cold record.  Our system is based on 
an opportunity to be heard before the decision, in most circumstances.  
That concept is deeply engrained in litigants as well as in lawyers and 
the law.261 
 
note 29, at 1033–34. 
 256. See Miller, supra note 22, at 1050; Martineau, supra note 29, at 1032. 
 257. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 29 (1997); see also supra note 222 and 
accompanying text (discussion of Trest). 
 258. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 684–85, 690; Miller, supra 
note 22, at 1050 & n.115 (stating that allowing briefing will mitigate concerns caused by 
lack of notice); cf. N.Y. Currency Research Corp. v. CFTC, 180 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 
1999) (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 156 (Crown 
Publishers 1984) (“Sentence first—verdict afterwards.”)).  This is the point made by the 
Supreme Court in Nelson v. Adams USA Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 468 (2000).  For a 
particularly rabid illustration of this point, see Vincent P. Tassinari, Patent 
Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, 5 J. INTELL. PROP L. 59, 136–53 (1997) 
(criticizing allegedly unbriefed dicta in the plurality opinion in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 502–13 (1964)). 
 259. Cf. STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 244. 
 260. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 690–91. 
 261. See Adams, 529 U.S. at 468 n.2. 
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C.  Supplemental Briefing Does Not Require Either Full Briefing                
or Substantial Delay 
Full briefs need not always be requested when the court raises a new 
issue.  The nature of the briefing can vary with the importance of the 
issue.262  An appropriate opportunity to respond may be by short 
supplemental briefs, letters, or otherwise.263 
The Chicago Council of Lawyers suggests the proper course to follow.  
Whenever the court (or an individual judge) is considering addressing 
significant or potentially dispositive issues, precedents, legal theories, 
arguments, or facts not contained in the briefs and the record, the court 
should notify the parties and provide them with an opportunity to 
address these matters.  Examples include the following: (1) Before oral 
argument, if the court discovers an issue that the parties can address in 
oral argument but have not briefed, the court should send a short written 
notice to the parties asking them to prepare the issue for oral argument.  
(2) During or after oral argument, if the court discovers an issue that the 
parties should address, it should ask the parties to address it in writing.264  
The response can be limited in both length and time.  For example, an 
order directing simultaneous submissions not to exceed five pages 
within seven days would be entirely appropriate.265 
Raising an issue at oral argument without giving lawyers time to think 
and respond is not enough of an opportunity to be heard.  While many 
courts will allow brief letters or briefs to be filed after argument, lawyers 
often aren’t aware of this procedural option, and should be told. 
The delay from this procedure would be minimal.  Parties can be 
asked to brief before or after argument.  They can be asked shortly 
before argument to address a case at argument.  Briefs can be filed 
successively or simultaneously.266 
 
 262. See Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to 
specify the briefing requirement as a per se rule). 
 263. Many court rules permit parties to file supplemental filings to address new 
matters.  See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28(j) (stating that a party may file a letter with 
supplemental authority).  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), has also taught us how 
rapidly supplemental briefs can be filed, when necessary. 
 264. See, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(directing supplemental briefs after oral argument). 
 265. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 689.  The Council added another 
useful point: 
In preparing for oral argument, if the court locates a case or statute that it 
believes should be addressed by the parties, the court should so notify the 
parties prior to oral argument so that counsel can prepare properly.  In this 
case, a telephone and fax notice should suffice. 
Id. 
 266. One objection to this suggestion is that there will be trouble with drawing lines 
between new issues and old issues.  Courts have argued in the past about whether issues 
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D.  Remand Should Be Used when Trial Court Input Would Be Useful 
Appellate courts should use remand in lieu of supplemental briefing 
whenever trial court or agency input would be useful.267  This can occur 
in the following several cases: (1) when the trial court or agency has 
already conducted a hearing and decided questions of facts or mixed 
questions of fact and law that are affected by the decision, (2) when it 
would be unfair to the parties to reach a decision without allowing the 
introduction of additional evidence, and (3) any other circumstance 
where the appellate court would benefit from the trial court’s decision. 
VII.  WHEN SHOULD COURTS BE MORE THAN UMPIRES? 
It is relatively easy to conclude that courts should give notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before deciding issues sua sponte; in most cases 
the costs are low and the benefits are high.  Ordering supplemental 
briefing (or a similar procedure) meets the due process objection to sua 
sponte decisions and accommodates many of the concerns raised by the 
tension among the adversary process model, the desire to do justice, and 
the desire to state rules for future cases. 
But ordering supplemental briefing does not resolve all concerns, for it 
does not answer when a court should raise a new issue (and order 
supplemental briefing) in the first place.  Any time an appellate court 
steps in, it is acting inconsistently with the adversary process model.  Is 
it possible to articulate a consistent rationale for doing so? 
A.  Possible Grounds for Sua Sponte Review 
Some commentators believe the answer is never.  One commentator 
has argued that the Supreme Court should never order rehearing sua 
 
are “new” or were sufficiently raised by the parties.  See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379–83 (1995) (discussing whether the issue is new); id. at 400–08 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 676–77 (1961); Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366, 1369–71 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (discussing whether the issue is new enough so that due process was violated by 
deciding it); Schmalle v. Schmalle, 586 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1998).  There will always be 
a question of line drawing; there is for every rule.  But that does not mean that there 
should be no line.  Whenever a court is raising an issue so that it is new enough so that 
the parties will think it was not previously raised, they should be given an appropriate 
opportunity to address the issue. 
 267. See INS v. Ventura, 123 S. Ct. 353, 354 (2002) (reversing the court of appeals 
for failing to remand the case for redetermination by the Board of Immigration Appeals). 
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sponte, except in the limited circumstances where a Justice missed the 
argument or the Court has changed composition.268  This extreme 
position is consistent with the adversary process model, but it fails to 
take into account the real, practical, and equitable concerns that lead 
courts to act sua sponte. 
Professor Martineau argued that appellate courts should allow parties 
to raise new issues on appeal only when they involve jurisdiction or in 
the same circumstances that they are permitted under Rule 60(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as mistake, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud.  A new issue 
should not be raised unless the party could not have raised it at trial.  He 
suggested that the well-developed body of law and limited reach of these 
exceptions would cabin appellate discretion within bounds.269 
This narrow scope for sua sponte raising of new issues on appeal 
seems too crabbed.270  The Supreme Court and other courts have 
responded to the legitimate pull of equity when they have raised issues 
sua sponte.  The challenge is whether courts (or commentators) can 
articulate factors that can provide some guidance to future courts, 
lawyers, and litigants as to when new issues should be raised. 
Suggesting this challenge is far easier than meeting it.  While subject 
matter jurisdiction is clearly a proper issue to raise sua sponte,271 it is 
difficult to see how any other category can be applied in a neutral 
fashion.  The following are some examples: First, issues such as comity, 
abstention, and federalism are very political to begin with.  While it is 
possible to argue that a state’s interest in being free from an improper 
result is high, state officials should not be allowed to defer raising 
defenses, permitting them to gamble on winning on other grounds in the 
trial court while counting on the appellate court to save them.272  When 
state officials fail to raise these issues or make deliberate concessions, 
why should states not be held to deliberate waivers? 
Second, an exception for issues of important public interest seems 
desirable at first blush, but what is an important public interest to one 
court will be unimportant to another.  The line will be particularly 
 
 268. Krimbel, supra note 27, at 946. 
 269. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1060; see also Larry A. Klein, Allowing Improper 
Argument of Counsel to Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal as Fundamental Error: 
Are Florida Courts Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water?, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
97, 124–26 (1998) (following Martineau and arguing that improper jury arguments 
should not be raised for the first time on appeal). 
 270. Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1006 (criticizing Martineau, inter alia, for 
focusing on the lawyer and not on the right of the litigant). 
 271. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1047. 
 272. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
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difficult to draw and will often appear nakedly political.273 
Third, an exception for issues that are entirely questions of law and 
have no factual dispute would allow sua sponte injection of new issues 
in many cases.  Such an exception, if uniformly applied, may be fair, 
enabling courts to ensure that the correct law is applied, as long as 
parties had not deliberately waived an issue below.274  If an appellate 
court would suggest the correct legal rule and order briefing in every 
case that was an option, the parties would likely view the result as more 
fair than the current system.  But courts would see a significant rise in 
their workload. 
Fourth, the miscarriage of justice standard is the most open to 
manipulation of all.275  Either a court must limit its use to the most rare 
cases or it must recognize that it is either changing its method of 
appellate review from the adversary process model to the equity model 
or it is allowing its judges to exercise unbridled discretion.276 
B.  Should We Have the Adversary Process Model or an Equity Model? 
In the end, the answer to the question of when appellate courts should 
be permitted to raise new issues sua sponte may depend on whether 
courts accept the arguments made by Dean Roscoe Pound that our 
appellate courts should move from the adversary process model to the 
concern for justice and truth that underlie the equity model.277  But if one 
accepts the premise that writ of error review remains the best model, 
appellate courts should be permitted to raise nonjurisdictional matters 
 
 273. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1001–03. 
 274. If a deliberate waiver had occurred, that could be raised in the supplemental 
briefing. 
 275. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 276. In addressing the question of when courts should allow parties to raise a new 
issue on appeal, a commentator has suggested that courts use a rule to balance the 
competing concerns of raising new issues to do justice, the limitations on the ability of 
the appellate court to find facts, and the need to prevent lawyers from hiding issues until 
appeal.  The proposed rule would permit sua sponte consideration either when there is 
great public interest or when there was no intentional waiver.  No further factual 
development of the record is necessary; there was no opportunity to raise the issue below 
and there would be no prejudice.  Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1011.  But this proposal 
does not help—the “great public interest” category swallows up the general prohibition 
against raising new issues.  Further, the parties will almost always have had the 
opportunity to raise sua sponte issues in the trial court—the issue is probably coming up 
because it is likely that the court’s version of the right answer did not occur to the parties 
or the court below. 
 277. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 385 (1941). 
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sua sponte only in the most exceptional cases, to remedy the gravest 
injustices. 
If the view were accepted that the equity model fits better with 
modern notions of justice and procedure, the adversary process model 
would not apply.  Instead, appellate courts could raise sua sponte any 
legal issue, or even any question, that they thought would lead to the 
fair, correct result in the case.  The court would then order supplemental 
briefing on the issue.  One ground to oppose the raising of the new issue 
would be waiver; the party opposing the new issue could always assert 
that the facts of that case made the application of the waiver rule 
appropriate, either because the waiver was deliberate or because any 
other result would encourage gamesmanship.278  The court could then 
decide whether to address the new issue and reach the proper result. 
There is no federal constitutional reason why all state courts must 
choose either the adversary process model or an equity model.  This may 
be a situation where the legal system would benefit by states applying 
different models for a period to see how they develop.  If the states were 
expressly to choose an adversary process model or an equity model for 
raising issues sua sponte in civil cases—and stick to it—we would be 
able to see whether states can administer the process (either way) fairly 
and consistently.279 
The author’s preference is for the equity model—even though its 
application will involve more work for appellate courts.  Hartmann was 
wrongly decided280 because the result was unfair, and the court knew it 
was unfair.  Plaintiffs’ counsel had not engaged in gamesmanship in 
choosing issues to waive, the court’s analysis advanced the law, and 
there was no reason for the court not to apply the correct rule of law to 
the litigants.  In the author’s view, appellate courts should be more free 
in suggesting that parties rebrief or reargue an issue that will lead to the 
correct result when fact situations squarely present unbriefed issues.  
From the lawyers’ side of the bench, the extra work that will be required 
for appellate courts to order and review supplemental briefing seems 
worth the increased number of correct, fair results. 
 
 278. Cf. Dennerline, supra note 29, at 989–90 (arguing that a lawyer who did not 
know of an issue below should be treated differently than a lawyer who intentionally 
concealed the issue). 
 279. This Article does not attempt to catalog the state statutes that may affect the 
right of a court to reach new issues sua sponte on appeal.  For such a listing, see 
generally Campbell, supra note 29. 
 280. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Lawyers and judges disagree on whether courts should take an activist 
stance towards raising new issues sua sponte.  But whichever stance a 
court chooses, the key is consistency.  “The only consistent feature of 
the current system is its inconsistency.”281  Spouting the general rule in 
some cases and the gorilla rule in others cannot be the correct answer.  
That is not a system of law; it is too close to a game of chance. 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled for decades with 
the tension between following rules and doing justice.  They have failed 
to articulate a meaningful standard for when courts should depart from 
the waiver rules of the adversary process model to raise new issues sua 
sponte. 
Justice Harlan’s words in Mapp v. Ohio still carry force: 
The occasion which the Court has taken here is in the context of a case where 
the question was briefed not at all and argued only extremely tangentially. The 
unwisdom of overruling Wolf without full-dress argument is aggravated by the 
circumstance that that decision is a comparatively recent one . . . .  I would think 
that our obligation to the States, on whom we impose this new rule, as well as 
the obligation of orderly adherence to our own processes would demand that we 
seek that aid which adequate briefing and argument leads to the determination 
of an important issue. . . . 
 Thus, if the Court were bent on reconsidering Wolf, I think that there would 
soon have presented itself an appropriate opportunity in which we could have 
had the benefit of full briefing and argument.  In any event, at the very least, the 
present case should have been set down for reargument, in view of the 
inadequate briefing and argument we have received on the Wolf point.  To all 
intents and purposes the court’s present action amounts to a summary reversal 
of Wolf, without argument. 
 I am bound to say that what has been done is not likely to promote respect 
either for the Court’s adjudicatory process or for the stability of its decisions.282 
Were Erie Railroad Co., Mapp, Washington v. Davis, Younger, and 
Batson wrongly decided on the merits?  That is in the eye of the 
beholder.  Would any of those decisions have been seen as less of an 
exercise of judicial will if the issues had been briefed before they were 
decided?  Possibly.  Would counsel and the parties have thought their 
cases received a fairer shake if the cases were decided on grounds they 
had been given a chance to brief?  That seems likely.  Are parties 
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before decision?  The 
 
 281. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1061. 
 282. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676–77 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
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answer should be “yes” from appellate courts, just as it is for other 
decisionmakers. 
The tension between law and equity, between procedural rules and 
doing justice, will always be with us.  So will the tension between doing 
justice for the parties and stating rules that will guide future conduct.  
But those tensions can be lessened by always giving parties notice and 
an opportunity to be heard before a court decides an issue.  Due process 
should require it; simple fairness already does. 
Notice and an opportunity to be heard before deciding a case sua 
sponte does not resolve the question of when a court should raise an 
issue sua sponte—it just makes the unequal application of waiver more 
fair to the litigants (and increases the accuracy of the decisionmaking 
process in some cases).  But courts should pay more attention to 
articulating and following a consistent series of rules for when they will 
intervene in the adversary process. 
The gorilla rule may be fine in the jungle.  But it does little to create 
respect for law in the courthouse.  It is time to use process to tame the 
gorilla. 
 
